Time for change

Life after the J&K Elections

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

To me, the key message that the J&K State Assembly election results announce is that the Kashmiris have overcome their fear of courting opposites, or apparent opposites. The politics of the state over the coming days will be marked by some interesting twists and turns. The people of Kashmir are learning to speak two contrasting languages at once: one of dissidence and anti-India sentiments, and the other of good governance and mainstream issues. Anyone therefore, who interprets the 2008 election result as the last nail in the coffin of separatist politics and azadi sentiments in J&K is mistaken. To reiterate an oft-repeated (yet essential) point, the overwhelming participation in the recent elections has been an expression of the popular desire for good governance in the state, not a verdict on the political problem that exists in Jammu and Kashmir. The politics of J&K will thus, in the days to come, be characterized by continued calls for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and focused and detailed roadmaps for doing so, with increased support from a cross-section of actors. Srinagar-based separatists may be temporarily overshadowed and silenced in their demands for azadi (with its varying meanings), but they will bounce back to prominence sooner rather than later.

Mainstreaming of political dissent
The other important political implication of this election is that it has demonstrated a mainstreaming of Kashmir’s separatist politics, at least to some extent. Gone are the days when the Kashmiri separatists were an untouchable lot and azadi meant (at least in the popular parlance) total separation from the Indian Union.  Today, separatist politics and azadi sentiments are more nuanced, more complex, and take many forms, ranging from the Hurriyat Conference to the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). In order to accurately interpret the internal politics of J&K, the entire spectrum of understandings and the blurred shades of opinion about azadi that exist between these two actors, must be correctly understood. The PDP would object to being called ‘pro-azadi’, ‘separatist’ or even ‘soft-separatist’, yet the fact remains that it walks a very fine line. While on one hand the self-rule proposal put forward by them is about more than what the constitution of India guarantees J&K and is closer to the platform proposed by self-proclaimed separatist leaders (such as Sajad Lone), on the other hand, the PDP has a political constituency that speaks the language of both separatism and azadi.  This explains why the very same people who were shouting slogans against India two months ago decided to cast their votes in the recent elections. Their votes did not signal an acceptance, even a tacit one, of the situation in the region; but rather an extremely nuanced form of protest, and an extremely mature one.

What of the National Conference (NC), the ruling party of the state for the next six years? Has the Omar Abdullah-led NC spoken the language of self-rule and tried to address the azadi sentiment? Omar has made it clear that this election is about electing a government that can efficiently and successfully govern, in every sense of the word. It is not about resolving the Kashmir issue. In other words, in the new politics of J&K some of this staunchly pro-India party’s political positions will need to be viewed as catering to the pro-azadi sentiments, even if indirectly. The NC has, after all, traditionally held that New Delhi should give J&K greater autonomy as well as regional autonomy. Therefore, if the PDP and NC, to a lesser extent, are willing to negotiate their way through the maze of the ‘separatist politics of Kashmir’, this ‘separatist politics’ will soon start mainstreaming itself.

If this occurs, moderates such as Sajad Lone and even Mirwaiz Umar Farooq will be forced to reconsider their options about the kind of politics they will choose to engage in over the coming days. Do they desire to forever represent themselves as political dissidents, making dissent a career rather than merely a necessary sortie, or do they someday wish to transcend this somewhat inhibiting tag to enter into the newly-emerging ‘soft-separatist’ fold? To do so they will need to rethink their habitual positions about political processes in J&K and consider toning down their anti-India rhetoric. If they try this course of action, which I believe they are likely to, we will see the creation of a new political space in the state which will be populated by parties that ask for more political, administrative and financial concessions from New Delhi, and demand increased linkages with PAK. This ‘mainstreaming of political dissent’ will have implications for the Kashmir issue as we know it, as well as for relations between India and Pakistan in the longer term. Any attempts by New Delhi to ignore and undermine this dissident space will prove disastrous for J&K.

‘Good governance plus’
If the argument is that this election was about the desire for good governance in the state and not about resolution of the Kashmir issue per se, then the question remains as to what is really at the heart of the issue? If the Kashmir problem is not all about good governance, and the lack of it, it must inherently be about something much deeper. In other words, will the azadi sentiments in the state cease to exist if the elected government there ensures bijli, sadak, pani? Quite succinctly: No. The Kashmir issue is about more than merely good governance; it must be understood as a political problem. But can good governance go some way toward resolving the nagging political problems? Unfortunately ensuring bijli, sadak, pani will not resolve the political aspects under dispute here. Rather, there needs to evolve an all-embracing ‘good governance plus’ package that addresses both Kashmir’s material and its political troubles. This package must engage expansively with all the actors of this new ‘soft-separatist’ political fold, if it is to comprehensively address their various demands.

This election, therefore, also acts as a wake-up call for both the Valley-based dissidents as well as for the government of India. While the dissidents need to engage in some serious introspection over how to increase their relevance in these changing times and how to shed their anachronistic political rigidities, New Delhi must likewise devise some improved policies to effectively engage the new political forces and developments in the state.  The status-quo option becomes increasingly archaic with every day that passes. It is time for change.

Source: Greater Kashmir, December 31, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=31_12_2008&ItemID=23&cat=11

The war rhetoric

Why War is no Solution Against Pakistan

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

There seems to be no let up of the war frenzy that is being promoted by sections of the Indian political elite, intelligentsia and the media. The Indian media, especially the many television channels, has been consistently promoting ‘pulp patriotism’ and egging on the government in New Delhi to carry out ‘surgical’, ‘preemptive’ strikes in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) in order to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure there. Similar arguments have been put forward by the nationalist Indian media after every major militant attack in this country. Thankfully, in the past, wisdom prevailed and the nationalist NDA government did not choose to go to war against Pakistan, even after the 2001 militant attacks on the Indian parliament when passions were running equally high.

That said, aren’t preemptive surgical strikes against terrorist training camps in PAK an option that India can safely exercise? Forget about ethics: isn’t victory that which defines the contours of morality in times of war? After all, many major world leaders have said that the Mumbai attackers were all Pakistanis and were trained in Pakistan. Even US President-elect Obama has gone on record saying that every country has the right to defend itself. So why not make use of this situation and attack the terror networks in Pakistan to get rid of the menace of terrorism once and for all? If India conducts smart, stealthy, successful military raids into PAK, don’t we stand to gain in every respect? Hasn’t Israel ‘successfully’ protected itself against terrorism by using precisely such preemptive tactics?

But beware the rhetorical question: matters of war and peace are never that simple. They are never merely about translating such simplistic nationalistic feelings into blind action. Despite being wounded by what happened in Mumbai and being pained by what continues to be perpetrated in India by Pakistan-based terrorists, it is clear to me that fighting a war against Pakistan in order to bring an end to terrorism against India is not a viable option for Indian policy makers. First of all, to state the glaringly obvious: India is not Israel. The anti-terror strategies that the seven-and-a-bit-million-people strong Israel uses cannot be emulated by India lest it find itself in the situation that Israel finds itself in today: encircled by disgruntled countries whose obvious distaste for the Jewish state fails to permit it any real sense of security. Despite claiming to be a democracy modeled on the western idea of a state, Israel remains without a constitution and with a polity dominated by orthodox religious ideologies. As a result of its constricted and meandering domestic policies and unstable relations with its neighbors, Israel has succeeded in isolating itself within its own region. Little wonder it feels alienated and insecure. India cannot, and should not, try to emulate Israel. Using their technologies to combat terror is one thing, but emulating Israel’s counter-terror policies is another matter entirely.

Having said this, let us examine the feasibility of taking the military option against Pakistan. I am convinced that there will not be a victor, at least in hard military terms, in any Indo-Pak conflict especially under the shadow of nuclear weapons. The conventional superiority that India had vis-à-vis Pakistan became redundant when the two countries became nuclear powers in 1998. Even surgical strikes are unlikely to reap India any clear dividends, primarily because Indian strikes deep inside Pakistani territory will only provoke comparable retaliatory action. In other words, surgical strikes may not remain at the less then limited level, they run the risk of graduating into a limited war, which in turn has the potential of escalating into an all-out war. Let us not forget that at its most basic level, a surgical strike is nothing more than an invitation to war, the military equivalent of a taunt, or an insult. It is an indignity that few states can turn a blind eye to. The 1999 Kargil limited war was not fought on Pakistani territory, but rather in defense of Indian ground. As such we were able to claim that our only desire, our only impetus for battle, was to evict hostile invaders; it was not to invade Pakistani territory. Also importantly, during the war the international community firmly sided with India. It may not be the same this time if India trespasses across the borders of Pakistan. The rules of international solidarity are different for aggressors; it is the invaded, not the invader, that engenders sympathy and support.

Even if India manages to take out key terrorist targets in PAK without igniting all-out nuclear war, what will we gain from it? Indian strikes inside Pakistan will swell the terrorist ranks with even more recruits committed to save the ‘pride of Islam’, they will underscore the necessity of having a ‘true’ Islamic republic of Pakistan and Pakistan will be rendered nothing less than a jihad factory. The Pakistani army, which has temporarily receded into the background, will come back to prominence and the ISI will be given a free hand to do whatever it pleases. The section of Pakistani civil society that has a great deal of admiration for India will turn completely antagonistic and will ask the Pakistani state to answer India in the same coin. Of course, a sustained war with India will prove disastrous for the beleaguered Pakistan, which is already reeling under massive economic, political and social pressures. The Pakistani state would find itself fighting wars both inside and outside of itself, and the various secessionist parts of the country would only contribute to its destabilization. India will eventually have, as Pervez Hoodbhoy once said, a nuclear Somalia for a neighbour. The great irony is that this would only be the beginning of our woes, though it might seem like the culmination of them all. You cannot, as they say, change your neighbours; they will continue to exist by your side in peace or in war.

In the final analysis, can India ‘win’ a war against Pakistan from a grand strategic point of view? No, it cannot. India will lose more than it will gain from a war with Pakistan. From a grand strategic point of view, India’s success lies in sustaining its economic growth, from being a responsible nation considered able to play a leading role in the management of the international security system and from building itself a stable, sympathetic neighborhood. All the diplomatic gains that India has achieved vis-à-vis Pakistan will go down the drain with one surgical strike across the Line of Control. In one fell swoop, India risks erasing years of carefully constructed legitimacy, as well as its (apparently steady) position as a responsible stakeholder in the international system. One reckless decision will mean the end of India’s moral high ground.

It is naïve, and it undermines the greater national interest of the country, to believe and behave as if all is lost on the Pakistan front. India must use more sophisticated and nuanced behind-the-curtain diplomacy to reach out to the people who matter in the Pakistani state, and the various states within that state. Imaginative, targeted and high level diplomacy helps in times of crisis; history has proven it time and again. Sadly however, Indo-Pak relations are littered with mistakes made by hasty and irresponsible, ill-informed and unbalanced, and quite simply ignorant, decisions. India must read the past to understand the future; it must learn the lessons of the history of international relations and behave accordingly.

Source: Greater Kashmir, 17 December 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=17_12_2008&ItemID=13&cat=11

India’s Fight Against Terror

Strong, sensitive and responsible leadership needed

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

India is gearing up to fight terrorism tooth and nail. Heads are rolling, new measurers are being announced, and more resources are being allocated to strengthen the national security apparatus. A lot of noise is being made. However, amongst the din there seems to be more anger than resolve, more clamor than commitment. Our problem is clear: in India we think we can resolve our troubles by shouting accusations from the rooftops and generally dissolving into uproar and outcry each time something goes amiss. Time and again, we rush to hold others responsible for what happens to us and revel when newspapers confidently run headlines such as: ‘Manmohan Singh Summons ISI Chief to New Delhi’. One thing is obvious to me though, whether it is fighting terrorism, weeding out corruption or preventing communal and regional conflicts from erupting, today this country faces two extreme choices: clean up its house and exist as a unified and secure nation, or refuse to do so and cease to exist. I do not want to sound presumptuous in trying to predict which of these two scenarios I think most likely to play out. Rather, I simply wish to comment upon a few key factors that may well hamper our fight against terrorism.

Shocking lack of accountability
This country’s security establishment has never been made accountable to the taxpayers, nor have they shown any respect for the responsibility vested in them. With an elitist tilt, they continue to behave as though they are colonial masters, owing no explanations or answers to anyone. While it is true that many of the principle sources of terrorism lay outside India, the fact remains that we ourselves are to blame for the way in which we have been successfully targeted by terrorists. If we don’t have a security apparatus that is transparent and accountable, there is nothing to prevent terrorists from repeatedly striking this country; lack of accountability leads to irresponsible behavior. It took more than one terrorist strike in the country for the Union Home Minister to be held accountable for his shoddy performance. One wonders why National Security Advisor M K Narayanan’s resignation has been rejected, despite the fact that he is as accountable as the Home Minister is, and more so: Narayanan has a history of being at the top when things go horribly wrong. Let us not forget that he was Director of the Intelligence Bureau when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated, an event which is now widely understood to be at least partly the result of intelligence failures, both in coordination and response capacity.

Creating stakeholders in the nation
Again, this is an oft-repeated statement but like it or not, stakeholders are the key to stability and peace in a pluralist country such as India. If India the state and India the nation, separate yet unified concepts that they are, are to be embraced by their citizens, then simplistic and frenzied chanting of ‘bharat mata ki jai’ or ‘vande mataram’ will not suffice. Common people should feel that they are as much a part of this nation as anybody else, and they should benefit from being part of it just as anybody else does. Being a conscientious citizen involves a two-way process of giving and taking. Equally, if the state requests undivided legitimacy from its members, it has a responsibility to see that the citizens benefit from the bargain. When those that receive no benefits from being a so-called ‘citizen’ become aggrieved, is it fair to accuse them of ‘unpatriotism’? When a North Indian is chased away from Mumbai by the ‘marathi manus’, when a Kashmiri Muslim is made to feel like an alien at Delhi airport, when some poor bihari laborers are sent back from Kashmir, and when the minorities of this country are repeatedly told by the unnerving nation-wide diffusion of fundamentalists that the former exist in this country at the mercy of the latter, it becomes imprudent of us to ask them to be patriotic. When the state and nation oppress someone, why would that someone feel obliged to safeguard the interests of that nation and state? The scenario is obviously illogical. I am not suggesting that oppressed people have a right to violence. What I am arguing is that when and if they do resort to it, we must be mature enough as a nation to perform some honest soul searching in order to see where we have gone wrong.

Political leadership 
This country desperately needs a strong, sensitive, responsible, visionary and pan-Indian political leadership that can think and act beyond narrow and petty political confines. Sadly, the majority of our leaders lack even the basic necessary qualities required to competently occupy the political offices of the country. Our leading politicians don’t seem to be able to think holistically, in terms of an integrated ‘India’. They apparently think only along narrow ideological, regional and religious lines; appeasement and partisan politics are the current order of the day. Our opposition leader did not even deem it necessary to attend the important all-party meeting that was held in the wake of the horrific Mumbai attacks. There is simply no cohesion of any kind among our political elites. This climate of political opportunism cannot be expected to give birth to national consensus. How can such a political class empower itself to fight terrorism credibly and responsibly? 

Members of contemporary India’s ruling class behave like thieves stealing all they can from a burning building before it is razed to the ground. While our country burns, the mad scramble of our political class for power and resources reaches new heights. If ‘thinking for India’ becomes nobody’s business, this country can expect nothing better than a swift slide into disintegration and destruction, and in truth, it will deserve nothing better.

(Happymon Jacob is Assistant Professor at the Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu, Jammu and Kashmir, India)

Source: Greater Kashmir, December 3, 2008. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=3_12_2008&ItemID=27&cat=11 )

Jammu University farewells the inimitable Prof. Mattoo

FAREWELL BY HAPPYMON JACOB

A University stands for humanism, for tolerance, for reason, for progress, for the adventure of ideas and for the search for the truth."  - Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Speaking at the Allahabad University in 1947
 
If it was one illustrious son of this state who spoke some six decades ago of the ideals that a university must stand for and live up to, today one can say with conviction that it is another son of the same soil who has successfully materialized Nehru's vision to its fullest; making the University of Jammu (JU) scale new heights of academic, professional and intellectual life. Today, the University of Jammu is increasingly seen as a burgeoning destination for quality research, imitable professional standards, and where intellectual tolerance coexists with relentless efforts towards engaging with the wider society beyond the university. JU's shepherd for the last six years is now primed to return to his parent institution, New Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), after having successfully taken, among other things, the valuable lessons learned with university classrooms outside and beyond them, to the people of this conflict-ridden state. 
 
Six Years Ago…
As was to be expected of a member of the New Delhi-based "Indian Foreign Policy Community", Amitabh Mattoo was reluctant to leave JNU and New Delhi and come to the then not-so-high-profile JU. Many of his friends and students- this author included- believed this act would be the beginning of the end for one of Indian television's most famous faces on foreign policy related issues. We were scared that Mattoo would be pushed to the peripheries of the Indian strategic community and would lose his intellectual imagination, not to mention expertise, in the narrow confines and petty politics of a regional university. Looking back now at the last six years of Mattoo as VC and the influence his tenure has had on himself and the University, we are convinced that the out-of-the-box-thinking-Mattoo has proven us wrong, yet again. What Amitbah Mattoo has done for JU and the education sector of this state for the last six years is too well-known to need to be recounted here. From setting up new and ambitious academic centers, to establishing the many much-needed off-site campuses, to garnering international recognition and collaboration for JU, to providing high-quality infrastructure, to getting professional recognition from the ISO, Mattoo has been a tireless crusader for quality, excellence and innovative forward-thinking. 
 
Leader, Teacher, Friend
Mattoo has been more than a Vice Chancellor for all of us: He has been an extremely talented leader who finds it important to engage with everybody, even those few disgruntled personalities within the university community. His talks on various topics at the University were great lessons in learning for the University community; Mattoo behaved like a friend, and not an all-powerful boss, with his colleagues.  People joked that he knew all the peons and drivers of the university by name and would take special care of their needs. In his own words, a university is perhaps one of the last remaining colonial institutions of our country, where the VC has such overarching powers as to enable him to do almost whatever he pleases to. And yet it was enlightening for us to watch him make responsible decisions in a much-needed and irrefutably democratic way. 
 
A Visionary  
Amitabh Mattoo likes to think out of the box – the importance of inventive and original thinking has been one of the many important pieces of wisdom that he has imparted to generations of his students at JNU – and not many people, even to this day, know of his unorthodox stances on almost everything, from the Kashmir issue, to Pakistan, to India as an emerging power. When it comes to intellectual curiosity and creativity, he doesn't care for the "correctness" (read: orthodoxy) of arguments. Even the most obstinate of New Delhi bureaucrats, who are not in the habit of listening to academics, take time out to listen to him, as they believe that Mattoo has something important to say about leading this country to its rightful destiny. This is precisely what made Prime Ministers belonging to political parties as fiercely opposed to each other as the Congress and the BJP call upon Mattoo for advice.
  
A Personal Journey with Him
For me, my personal journey with Mattoo has so far been one of intellectual exploration, academic pursuits and, to a great extent, intellectual transformation. Seven years ago when I arrived as a young and starry-eyed M. Phil student at JNU, my motivation was driven by nothing more than mere provincial intellectualism, with all its attendant limitations. Be it as his student at JNU, fellow-peacemaker in the Pugwash Conferences, faculty colleague at JU, co-author of books and articles, or even critiquing each others arguments, it's been an ongoing learning experience. Journeying with Mattoo through the intellectual minefields of J&K, the absurdities of India-Pakistan relations, and seeing and helping people build peace, I realized the importance of visionary teachers in one's life. That is why I am convinced that the students and faculty of the University of Jammu will miss him in the days to come. 
 
Looking ahead 
Mattoo has been a unifying force and was always happy to take everybody on board with him on all issues and initiatives.  Yet there were elements that did not quite like his style of operations and tried to malign his many initiatives with their multiple baseless allegations. Again as Nehru rightly said, "[ b]ut if the temple of learning itself becomes a home of narrow bigotry and petty objectives, how then will the nation prosper or a people grow in stature?" 
 
I sincerely hope that the University of Jammu will realize the importance of all that Amitabh Mattoo has contributed to it and in doing so, that it will grow to understand the worth of the man in the days, and years, to come.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, OVEMBER 20, 2008. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=17_11_2008&ItemID=48&cat=11 )

Rethinking Obama’s Kashmir Musings

Let’s understand the statement in the right perspective

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

It is always inspiring to witness the power of speech and words. Many amongst us have for too long subscribed to the dictum that actions always speak louder, but US President-elect, Barack Hussein Obama may yet prove us all wrong: Words are no less actions - they truly can match the healing power of deeds.

Obama’s recent words about Kashmir have many sections of the Kashmiri leadership, as well as people all across the state, in a jubilant mood…and New Delhi up in arms. The debate over the true nature of his inner ruminations has already begun, with New Delhi responding to the US President-elect’s statements with a knee-jerk reaction, and Kashmiri dissident leadership blowing their significance far out of proportion. Differing reactions from New Delhi and Kashmir notwithstanding, we must be clearheaded, maintain our sense of history, and consider cannons of realpolitik, when analyzing the complexities of Obama’s words. What does Obama really mean when he talks about Kashmir? Does he really intend to delve into Kashmir’s many conflicts? Even if he is serious, how much can he really achieve? Will the liberal interventionist stance of the Democratic Party bear fruit in an increasingly anti-American world? When all is said and done: How should Indians and Kashmiris interpret Barack Obama’s statements? 

Let us first begin by trying to deconstruct the comments Obama has made about Kashmir, and discuss how his words can be interpreted. To summarize, he has said that Pakistan must concentrate more on confronting militants along its Afghan border, and that resolution of the Kashmir issue would help Pakistan to focus on this extremely important task. Additionally, Obama has asserted that to help resolve the Kashmir issue, Bill Clinton could potentially be sent in the role of a special envoy. What does this mean, in essence? It could be understood as suggesting, contrary to the various interpretations flowing out of New Delhi and Srinagar, that Pakistan will be asked to ‘forget’ about Kashmir, and get its own house in order. It may also mean that the US would work to persuade Pakistan and India to think in terms of the newly emergent set of ideas about Kashmir that I wish to term as a ‘quasi-consensus’ regarding a potential solution to Kashmir (with items such as cross-LoC institutions and trade, non-alteration of borders, phased demilitarization, and the eradication of militancy etc.). Such a set of ideas may not be rejected out of hand by India. These feats could all potentially be accomplished through the good offices of a special envoy. Overall, Obama’s words might be construed as meaning that America’s primary concern is militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As such, it will seek to ‘help Pakistan out of Kashmir’, in order to allow the direction all of Pakistan’s effort towards the, apparently more pressing, matter of Pakistan/Afghanistan instability. 

Would this be such a bad arrangement for New Delhi? Perhaps not, substantively speaking; a liberal reading of what Manmohan Singh, Musharraff and Zardari have articulated over the years regarding a possible Kashmir resolution formula may indeed result in something like this, minus direct US mediation of course. But what of this possible US mediation? America has refereed between the two neighbours in the past, most prominently during the Kargil War, and its actions were apparently acceptable to India at this time. Therefore, if the Kashmir solution and US mediation can follow the path of the above ideas, New Delhi might be talked into accepting it.

Now, how might the Kashmiris react if Obama has indeed meant the above, and nothing more? The aforementioned strategy may not be such a bad deal for them either. After all, a significant number of mainstream and dissident Kashmiri leaders, and in fact, many people in general, are talking along these lines. Have they realized that this is perhaps the most realistic way of getting what they want? 

A number of fears have found voice as a result of Obama’s recent words: What if Obama intends to make Kashmir the next target and laboratory of his Party’s traditional liberal interventionist agenda? What if he is talking about becoming aggressive with India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir in a US-designed manner? What if the US puts pressure on India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir? Quite simply, he is unlikely to make any such types of decisions. Additionally, despite UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s gentle reminder that “[i]f and when both parties (India and Pakistan) to this issue (Kashmir) request ... ask me to provide my good offices, I am willing to do that”, in reality the UN resolutions concerning a plebiscite in Kashmir are long forgotten. Thirdly, if the US was naïve enough to exert too much pressure on New Delhi, this would most likely backfire. India’s leadership, and citizens in general, are unlikely to accept any such pressure from Washington. Following this course of action would only increase the already prevalent anti-American feeling among many sections of Indian public. More importantly, hardball diplomacy from the US would almost certainly cause New Delhi to harden its stated position on Kashmir, and the forward momentum that has been gained so far would be lost. In other words, a belligerent liberal interventionist Obama administration would do more harm than good to Kashmir, and to the political arguments of the Kashmir cause.

So how should New Delhi, and the Kashmiris themselves, respond to Obama’s proclamations about Kashmir?  New Delhi should have been, and still can be, more nuanced, cautious, reflective and statesmanlike in its reactions to Obama’s statements. It needs to find the political maturity and diplomatic self-confidence to see the merit in what the US might be saying, and in doing so, it may be able to turn the argument in its favour. This would be true statecraft. New Delhi must stop believing that it can prevent the countries of the world from recognizing and discussing Kashmir. If India truly desires a conclusion to the Kashmir imbroglio it must listen to the ways powerful world leaders are suggesting it could be resolved, especially given that these suggestions are very much along the lines promoted by New Delhi in the recent past. Why not see reason and move forward? 

Having said this, those who would like to see US mediation in Kashmir, in whatever shape or form, should also remember that US interventionism has a turbulent and controversial history. It has frequently had ulterior motives, and has rarely benefited the nations that have experienced its full force. On most occasions US intervention, for all its good intentions, has only made things worse. However, if Obama has genuine and peaceful intentions vis-à-vis Kashmir, he must be willing to work hard to initiate constructive dialogue between the many stakeholders involved in the conflict. To do this, he must get all parties on board (Pakistan has yet to respond to Obama’s remarks with any sort of coherency) by clarifying the basic parameters and starting points, and by being cautious and careful. In short, by employing some seriously smart diplomacy. The final question remains, though: Is the US really ready, willing and able to take on a challenge as grand as this one?

(Source: Greater Kashmir, NOVEMBER 12, 2008. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=12_11_2008&ItemID=12&cat=11)

A momentous semi-final

Debashish Mukerji and Varghese K George, Hindustan Times

New Delhi, November 07, 2008

First Published: 01:11 IST(7/11/2008)

Last Updated: 01:13 IST(7/11/2008)

There is a key difference in the thrust of the Congress and the BJP as both parties go full throttle into their campaigns for the assembly elections to be held over the next six weeks in six states: Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, Mizoram, Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir.

Since the BJP is in power in three of the six - Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan - and the Congress only in Delhi, the latter prefers to concentrate on local issues, pointing to the various shortcomings in the performance of the incumbent BJP governments. The BJP, in contrast, is focusing largely on national issues, which would put the Congress led union government in the dock.

“A long season of electioneering has begun. The campaign is also for the next general elections,” said leader of the opposition and NDA prime ministerial candidate L K Advani. (see interview)

"We expect a resounding vote against the BJP's corruption, divisive politics and misgovernance in Rajasthan, MP and Chhattisgarh,” said Congress spokesperson Abhishek Manu Singhvi.

But as 10 crore Indian voters - almost the entire population of  the United Kingdom and Spain combined - prepare to vote, both parties are agreed that this is a significant semi-final before the grand final of Indian politics - elections to the 15th Lok Sabha in less than six months from now.

Seventy nine of India’s 543 parliament constituencies fall in these six states, with one seventh of India’s total electorate. It’s the first time during the tenure of the current union government that six states are voting together.

The BJP has been ruling Rajasthan, MP and Chhattisgarh for a single term, the Congress has held Delhi for two.  J&K, ruled by a Congress-PDP coalition, went under Governor’s Rule once the coalition came apart last July, while an MNF government has presided over Mizoram for two terms as well. Congress is fighting regional parties, the National Conference and the People’s Democratic Party in J &K, and Mizo National Front (MNF) in Mizoram.

“Local issues are important, but the current campaign will also involve a meaningful discussion on national issues,” said Arun Jaitley, BJP general secretary. Advani listed terrorism, inflation, and the agrarian crisis as the issues that will dominate (See interview).

A sharp focus on state issues will hurt the BJP. In MP, it had to change its chief minister twice in five years. Uma Bharati was replaced by Babulal Gaur, who in turn made way for Shivraj Singh Chouhan. The Chouhan ministry has seen its share of financial scandals too, notably one relating to the purchase of medical equipment and another where trucks belonging to the chief minister’s wife were involved

Dissensions within, and two major agitations by the Gujjars, in 2007 and again in 2008, demanding scheduled tribe status -  which saw more than  60 deaths, most of them due to police firing on violent mobs – have also chipped away at the image of the Vasundhara Raje led BJP government in Rajasthan. In Chhattisgarh, the government has not been able to rein in the Naxalites. “BJP’s attempt is to avoid discussions on these issues. But they won’t succeed,” says Sitaram Yechuri, CPM politburo member.

The J&K polls are of high national significance by themselves. In the Kashmir valley – reeling under a renewed demand for azaadi - the willingness of the electorate to participate in the poll itself is under question. A transparent election with wide participation will dampen the azaadi cries. "Pakistan has never been so flexible on the Kashmir issue as it is now," said Happymon Jacob, coordinator of Pugwash, an international NGO dedicated to resolving armed conflicts, which is also involved in  Kashmir. "It chose not to take advantage of the recent agitation in the valley. Mainstream parties like the PDP too are reinterpreting azaadi in a more nuanced way. This is good news."

The results of the semi-finals may not necessarily be a forerunner to what will happen in the final. In late 2003, convincing victories in Chhattisgarh, MP and Rajasthan had prompted the BJP to advance the national elections that they lost in May 2004!

But the outcome will influence the formation of national alliances – for instance, a BJP surge will entice AIADMK towards it, while the Congress and the Left would seek to renew their friendship.

Sourse: Hindustan Times, November 07, 2008. URL: http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=9fc078bf-9197-4f74-8995-eae63c0c3ac0&ParentID=64224c07-442b-4b61-84b6-6a78d8e3f99d&MatchID1=4816&TeamID1=6&TeamID2=1&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1212&PrimaryID=4816&Headline=A+momentous+semi-final

J&K Confronts New Delhi’s Electoral Delusions

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

One is not sure if India and Pakistan have a grand strategy to resolve the Kashmir issue as they are too preoccupied with more pressing concerns - electoral and others. The recent start in cross-LoC trade cannot, therefore, be seen as a calculated strategy of conflict resolution, but rather an act under immense political pressure, at best. However, sometimes certain acts have positive unintended consequences, and so will this one.

Kashmir has been rife with both ideas and activities in the past week: the hustle and bustle of electoral politics, symbolism of cross-LoC trade, and the PDP’s attempt to fire the Kashmiri political imagination with its self-rule proposal. Despite arriving from three separate political vantage points, and compromising three unique combinations of political, economic and social calculations, they seem to have one thing in common: the potential to address the many complex political, economic and emotional demands of Kashmiris. 

Trade and democracy appear to have the inherent capability to bring an end to militarized clashes between countries embroiled in protracted conflicts. Will this widely acclaimed wisdom of the liberal peace thesis, when combined with contemporary out-of-the-box grand ideas, prove the key to unlocking India-Pakistan relations and, as well, the tangle of Kashmir?

Elections and More

The forthcoming Assembly elections in J&K should not be seen as a conclusion in and of themselves, but instead as a means to a much higher end: addressing the core question of J&K in a more substantively responsible political manner. National Conference President, Omar Abdullah, has said unequivocally that this election will only be useful in forming a government equipped to deal with the day-to-day issues of the people of the state. Larger political issues, he clarified, need to be dealt with separately, at a different level. 

In other words, Omar’s argument goes against the long-held wisdom in New Delhi’s corridors of power that elections, ipso facto, are a solution to the problem in J&K. Today there are both dissident and mainstream parties articulating this new political argument: that the elections to the Assembly will provide for state administration only, yet fail to address deeper problems. The PDP has embraced this new line of thinking and will take into these elections a blueprint for the political resolution of the Kashmir issue. 

The Symbolism and Substance of Cross-LoC Trade

Thirteen decorated trucks plying the Jhelum Valley Road after a gap of sixty one years crossed over into Pakistan Administered Kashmir through the Kaman Post Bridge on the Line of Control. This image, one hopes, is indicative of improved times to come, even as it is at best symbolic and not yet substantive. Such limited, controlled, barter trade of select items between the two sides of the former Princely State does not make great economic sense at present. However, it represents the correct symbolic environment for deepening and reinforcing the liberal peace thesis: peace cannot lag far behind trade and the opening of borders. 

More importantly, despite the recent anti-India protests on the streets of Srinagar, the initiative taken by Governor N N Vohra has been received well by the people of the state. All sections of Kashmir opinion seem to have endorsed it, whether implicitly or explicitly. The militants have not directly opposed it, nor have dissident factions appeared uneasy about taking the credit for forcing the government to begin the trade.  In the end, cross-LoC trade should be seen as a litmus test for New Delhi’s sincerity towards the people of J&K. One genuinely hopes that the trade does not meet with the same fate as that of the Srinagar-Mzazaffarabad road, upon which traveling has become too cumbersome for the locals, thanks to a stubborn and unimaginative bureaucracy. 

PDP’s Self-Rule Proposal 

The recently unveiled self-rule proposal by the PDP is a compelling experiment by a mainstream political party in the state to think innovatively about Jammu and Kashmir. The document has worked usefully and creatively to reinterpret traditional conceptions of sovereignty. This document ought correctly to be seen as a significant addition to the equally important proposals put forth by various other J&K political parties: Sajad Lone’s Achievable Nationhood and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq’s ‘United States of Kashmir’ proposal. The importance of the PDP suggestion lies in the fact that this is perhaps the first time that a mainstream political party has dared to extend the meaning of sovereignty, and has demanded the restoration of the historical linkages with the Pakistani side of the State. Until now New Delhi had rejected and/or ignored similar proposals, including even Sajad Lone’s, citing the excuse that they had come from dissidents, who it does not recognize as legitimate representatives of the people. But circumstances have changed. How can New Delhi dismiss a proposal that has come from a political party, which has already ruled the state once, and is firmly mainstream?

Ideas and proposals such as dual currency, the roll-back of Central laws, an elected Governor, a Free Economic Zone, renaming of the titles of Governor and Chief minister as Sadar-i-Riyasat (President) and Prime Minister respectively, should not be considered as mere election gimmicks to gain more votes, but rather as the beginning of a new era of politics in the state: one that will revolve around significant issues of this kind. More importantly, there needs to be an in-depth comparative analysis of the various proposals, such as these, to delineate the common arguments they are making.

The political opponents of these proposals will raise the predictable and familiar objection of ‘erosion of sovereignty’. They need to understand that they are simply an initial attempt to re-imagine the concept of sovereignty, and that sovereignty should be creatively extended and, if necessary, redefined in order to meet the particular demands of the people and the unique needs of the time. In other words, make peace with sovereignty, not war. More importantly, if Manmohan Singh was serious when he said that while he is not ready to alter the borders between India and Pakistan, he is ready to help make them irrelevant, here is an opportunity for him to seriously engage Kashmiris on the basis of these ideas.

Ultimately, unhindered trade and other forms of connectivity between the two sides of the State, free and fair elections to the State Assembly, and grand new ideas such as the ones presented by the various parties to the people of J&K, have the potential to transform the political discourse in the State for the better.  The parties of J&K have initiated a tryst with liberal peace thesis, and for the good of the people of J&K, New Delhi had best accept it.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, October 29, 2008. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=29_10_2008&ItemID=14&cat=11)

With Paolo, Mehbooba Mufti and Tariq Hameed Karra

With Mirwaiz Umar Farooq (While he was under House Arrest)

With Vice President of India, Hamid Ansari, and Paolo Cottaramusino

Kashmir’s failed uprising

Calls by the Prime Minister and the Hurriyat Conference chief for dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue indicate that the recent uprising seems to have lost its momentum.

Photos: PTI, Nissar Ahmad 
 
Divergent opinion: Syed Ali Shah Geelani (Left) and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq have radically different views on what azadi entails.

Elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly have been announced, and are scheduled to be held in seven phases spread over five weeks. The decision to go ahead with the elections on schedule was taken following intensive discussion, punctuated by numerous disagreements, from both the Election Commission and the mainstream political parties in J&K. The dissidents have made it clear that they will not only boycott the elections, but will also actively campaign against the electoral process itself.

Even as the debate about the political wisdom of conducting elections at this point in time rages on, now is an opportune moment to take a close look at the recent uprising in Kashmir, and ask why it has failed to achieve anything substantial. After almost four months of anti-India slogans and sustained agitation, and despite limited moves towards unity by the Srinagar-based dissident camp, the current uprising in Kashmir seems to have reached a dead-end. Calls by the Prime Minister and the Hurriyat Conference (Mirwaiz) chief for dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue, indicate that the recent uprising, which garnered nationwide attention, seems to have lost its momentum.

Indeed, Kashmir’s latest experiment with dissidence did appear to have the right mix of all the necessary ingredients for success: mass participation, willingness to defy state crackdown, emotive slogans striking the right Kashmiri chords, timely political alliances and the ever-green romanticism of azadi. More importantly, unlike during the 1990s, the Indian intelligentsia was more sympathetic to the Kashmiri cause this time around, while militants kept away from the scene, not wanting to malign the mass movement. Yet the uprising seems to have fizzled out. It has quite obviously failed to reach any logical conclusion, although its reverberations will continue to impact on the state’s polity for a very long time to come.

What explains its failure?

What then explains its failure? Have dissenting Kashmiris grown disillusioned, sceptical as to the fruits of their struggle against the Indian state, and resigned themselves to submission? Or, can its failure be attributed to successful handling of the situation by the governments of New Delhi and Srinagar? Has the Indian state, after all, learned to contain dissidence in its frontiers? Not really.

An ex post facto analysis of the recent events in Kashmir reveals a clear set of factors responsible for the failure of the Valley’s latest uprising. First of all, the dissident leadership in the Valley did not have a common minimum programme. The lack of an understanding of their political endgame rendered them incapable of negotiating effectively with New Delhi.

Secondly, this lack of common understanding was augmented by acute dissent and leadership struggles within the dissident camp. Hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s claim to ‘sole leadership’ failed to resonate with the other leaders, who have since sought to distance themselves from him. Opposition became all the more serious when Mr. Geelani began questioning the credentials of other dissident leaders to lead the Kashmiris.

Many meanings of azadi

In addition to the aforementioned factors, differences of opinion within the dissident camp represent more than a mere leadership struggle. They stem from something fundamentally ideological: differing conceptions of the very meaning of azadi. That the camp did not have a commonly agreed upon programme, and was stalled by leadership quarrels, underscores the fact that there are many meanings of azadi in the Kashmir Valley. To the one extreme there are those who, like many of the mainstream parties within J&K (such as the National Conference), argue that the word points to greater autonomy and additional political rights. And to the other are those (represented by the JKLF and Mr. Geelani) who typically seek complete independence from India, and see azadi as embodying this desire. Somewhere between these two divergent views are those who argue that it is the Kashmiris’ demand for self-respect, dignity and their inalienable democratic rights, which constitute the true basis of azadi.

The two most important pro-azadi leaders in the Valley, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Mr. Geelani, have radically different views as to what azadientails. Consider, for example, that Mirwaiz has been an important moderate voice, whereas Mr. Geelani harbours no such illusions of temperance. A close reading of Mirwaiz’s statements, taken at various points in time, makes clear that he is more pro-Kashmir than anti-India, willing to talk to and reason with New Delhi, and is flexible in relation to what self-determination entails; his ‘United States of Kashmir’ proposal does not seek complete independence for Kashmir. In other words, the Mirwaiz is willing to make adjustments and seek balance when talking to New Delhi. But Mr. Geelani has made it clear that the resolution to the Kashmir problem lies in nothing short of Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan, and rejects the need to converse with New Delhi.

Most importantly, however, azadi needs to be understood as the rallying cry of a large number of an aggrieved people. For them, the word means something more tangible, something that pertains to their daily lives, than anything so fundamentally ideological: it means freedom from the fear of militants and security forces, as well as dignity, and the absence of New Delhi’s political high-handedness. Moreover, one would have to concede that it is a question of the unresolved issue of sub-national aspirations, and its consequences within the Indian state.

Zardari’s Kashmir policy

The relative silence of Pakistan, and the pro-India statements of President Zardari, should be understood as the fourth reason for the failure of the dissident movement. That Zardari did not choose to lash out against India during the recent anti-India protests in Kashmir is significant. His assurances that there would soon be good news about Kashmir and that both the countries are working towards it show a desire to distance himself from Pakistan’s traditional stance on Kashmir. And more was to follow. Recently he branded Kashmiri militants as “terrorists” and claimed that India was important for Pakistan’s growth. Surprisingly, he received little rebuke for these comments from within his country. Pakistan’s desire to make peace with India, and to rid itself of extremism, also means that it many not continue to support the various dissident parties within Kashmir — as it has done in the past — at the expense of India and its fight with terrorism, though the Pakistani Army and the ISI may fail to demonstratively adhere to this new way of thinking.

Lastly, the anti-Kashmir agitations in Jammu dented the dissident cause. For the rest of the world, ‘Kashmir’s freedom struggle’ is now more nuanced, and Jammu has played an important part in highlighting the conflicts within the conflict. Agitations in Jammu made obvious to all what was already well known within J&K: Jammu and Leh have never been part of the struggle in Kashmir, and were always uneasy about the political supremacy of Kashmiris in the state. Kashmiris have always relied on their own centrality to tell the story of their struggle, yet the reorientation of focus towards the politics of the Kashmiri/Jammuite relationship, have complicated the equation. The introduction of the Jammu and, to a lesser extent, the Leh narratives have crowded the picture. A conflict-within-a-conflict has been unearthed, and it threatens to disrupt the over-simplified nature of the Kashmiri’s argument.

That said, much as New Delhi hopes that elections in the State will bring back normalcy, it needs to ensure that those elections are free and fair, lest the State fall back once more into instability. In other words, New Delhi, in its over-enthusiasm to stabilise the state, must not try to create a façade of normalcy by playing foul with elections. It must demonstrate what it has learnt since 2002, and let the electoral process answer questions it cannot.

(Source: The Hindu, October 25, 2008. URL: http://www.hindu.com/2008/10/25/stories/2008102556301100.htm )

With AJK Prime Minister Sardar Attique Ahmd Khan

With Ex-President Musharraf in the President's office in Islamabad

With President Zardai at the Zardari House, Islamabad

Manmohan, Zardari, Train, Trade, and Kashmir

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

There is so much more happening in and around Kashmir these days than curfews and anti-India slogans. Some of these occurrences, if planned, managed and executed with political acumen and administrative imagination, could transform Kashmir for the better. Unfortunately, given the inherent difficulties, this is a scenario which may be unlikely to occur.  Zardari’s latest pronouncements on Kashmir and India, Manmohan Singh’s offer of dialogue and new sops for Kashmir, the AJK trade delegation’s visit to J&K, and the symbolism of the train to Kashmir have one thing in common: they have the potential, especially in combination with each other, to change the political climate in Kashmir. 

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s half-hearted invitation to Kashmiri separatists to come to the negotiating table at a time ‘to be decided in future’, may not mean much but for the fact that the separatist leadership too, has said that they are willing to talk to the government, though not in response to Dr. Singh’s invitation. While one would welcome Dr. Singh’s offer for talks, one, at the same time, also wonders about the sincerity and statesmanship in it. In other words, shouldn’t the Prime Minister be doing more than merely reciting a speech written by a nondescript speechwriter, especially in a state that has witnessed nothing but violence over the last two months? Yet the offer for dialogue may prove positive in and of itself, under the circumstances. 

President Zardari was much more forthcoming in New York, with his non-traditional comments on India, Kashmir and ‘freedom fighters’. Despite the otherwise inflammatory comments made by him in the US, such as branding the Kashmiri militants ‘terrorists’, and claiming that India was important for Pakistan’s growth, he did not (surprisingly) receive much flak from within Pakistan. Had a Pakistani leader made comments such as these a few years ago, he/she would have been virtually lynched by all sections of Pakistani society for being ‘anti-Pakistan’. Not this time. What this demonstrates is the deeper changes taking place in Pakistan, including its desire to make peace with India and to rid itself of extremism. It seems as though Pakistan is learning to be at ease with India. This is, perhaps, an indication of encouraging developments on the subcontinent and bodes well for the future of the region.  

The Kashmir Valley’s first train between the Budgam and Islamabad districts was inaugurated by Dr. Singh, even as there was a complete shut down in Srinagar. While the recent political overheating may have distracted attention from this historic event, and robbed it of some well-deserved fanfare, the train to Kashmir undoubtedly represents a new era in the politics and development of the Valley. Once operational, the many more promised trains from Kashmir to other parts of the country may well be seen as tangible evidence of development in a state with an otherwise depressing infrastructure, despite considerable financial investment by the Indian government.

The meetings held between the trade delegation from across the LoC and their counterparts in Srinagar and Jammu produced many encouraging and out-of-the-box plans, which if allowed to progress unhindered, may go a long way toward substantively addressing the Kashmir issue. Delegations from the Pakistan Administered Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have decided to recommend to their respective governments the implementation of some key measures. These include the formation of a joint business chamber, use of the dual currency of India and Pakistan for trade, and the opening of branches of their premium banks in one another’s regions in order to facilitate trade. Some of these measures are, in fact, only in keeping with those that had recently been under discussion by both the J&K Bank and the PDP. While the JK Bank had already mooted the idea of opening its branches in Pakistan, the PDP had pitched in for the use of dual currency within the state. The symbolic, as well as the concrete, impact of trade between the two sides of the erstwhile Princely State would be enormously beneficial for it, as well as for the region as a whole. 

Taken together, each of these four factors would have implications. Firstly, they would impact the pro-azadi movement in the state. The already faltering dissident movement for azadi may now run the risk of being overshadowed by the symbolism and political dynamics of these factors. While they alone would not result in the demise (even temporarily) of the azadi movement, they will, from now on, lessen its sheen somewhat. Secondly, these factors are also likely to overhaul the political discourse in Kashmir, with issues such as trade and economy becoming the mainstay of a new rhetoric. They are similarly likely to set in motion a process conducive for the ‘mainstreaming of the mainstream’ in Kashmir. The mainstream political parties that have been sidelined in the politics of Kashmir for the past few months now have a window of opportunity to return. Ultimately however, the biggest beneficiary of all of this is India-Pakistan relations. There is rapprochement in sight for Indo-Pak relations in general, and Kashmir in particular. A revival of back channel diplomacy between the two sides, equal to that which previously existed during the heyday of Musharraff and Manmohan Singh, is also likely in the months to follow. 

Having said this, it is important for New Delhi to keep in mind that economic packages are no substitute for political packages. What J&K needs is an imaginative political package and not economic largesse by Indian taxpayers.

(Source: Greater KAshmir, OCTOBER 16, 2008, Source: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=15_10_2008&ItemID=3&cat=11 )

Questions for Kashmiris

What next and how? We need to answer

STATE CRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Now that there seems to be developing, for the first time, a no-holds-barred discussion by the Kashmiri intellectuals on their pro-azadi leaders, I wish to ask a set of questions to the people of Kashmir. Before I do so, I would like to clarify that I ask these questions as an Indian with left liberal political leanings and sympathies for the Kashmiri ‘cause’. Even as the Kashmiri cause is itself disputed and that there are indeed many meanings of azadi in the valley, let’s assume that Kashmiris’ demand for self-respect, dignity and their inalienable democratic rights constitute the basis of such a cause. While my questions themselves may in fact be biased given the socio-political context that I come from, I am hopeful that you will find these questions worth reflecting upon. 

A cursory glance at the events of the last three months in Kashmir would reveal that the movement in Kashmir had all the right ingredients for success: mass participation, willingness to defy state crackdown, ability to stand up to economic blockades by Jammu, crafty political moves, emotive slogans striking the right Kashmiri chords, timely political alliances and the ever-green romanticism of azadi etc. etc. In the past few months, you have lost many precious lives, lost out economically, your youngsters have missed their classes, and many of you are still in the hospitals and some in jails. Even as hundreds of thousands of people were on the streets protesting against the Indian state, the armed militants kept away from the scene not wanting to vitiate a people’s struggle for their rights. Indeed, there were many sympathetic voices from the Indian intelligentsia in support of the Kashmiri cause, even as their sympathy would not mean accepting independence for Kashmir (as many of us do not think that azadi means independence), and there was semblance of a mainstream political willingness within India to look at what went wrong in Kashmir, and not blame Kashmiris for everything that is going wrong in Kashmir. And all this, do bear in mind, was unprecedented, unexpected and, of course, welcome. You managed to resurrect a dead cause from the burial ground. But despite all this, my question is, what have you achieved in the last three months? 

Despite all the favourable factors, the recent uprising seems to have run out of steam despite the continuing claims by the dissident leadership that the struggle is still on and in full swing and that it will succeed, come what may. Notwithstanding their claims, the uprising seems to have failed to reach any logical conclusion. 

 The jury is still out, many might argue, as to whether the latest uprising is over or not. Whether it is to be termed a lost rebellion, dead cause, failed uprising or a temporary setback awaiting a revival, one can argue, is something only time can tell. Agreed, but the question remains unanswered: why did the last three months, in the final analysis, not achieve anything concrete? Why wouldn’t the last three months go down in Kashmir’s history as nothing but a lot of shouting about and venting out political frustrations? 

Why did this happen? Why did your biggest ever uprising fail to achieve anything concrete? Is it because of the successful handling of the situation by the government? Is it because the Indian state has, after all, learned to contain dissidence in its frontiers without relenting even a bit? I am convinced that these are not the reasons for that.

 

I have no definite answer to these questions either. This is for the Kashmiri mind to ponder on. I am not a Kashmiri and I, therefore, cannot think like one. A political introspection is warranted at this juncture just because any movement that is not guided by critical self-reflection and objective introspection about its goals, trajectory, strategies, leadership etc. is bound to doom. Today you are leading your leaders - who seem not only reluctant participants in this movement but also ill-equipped to lead - and that is precisely why there is still life in it; tomorrow you will go back to your daily chores, what will happen to your movement then? Does it have the strength to sustain itself and to win once the streets of Srinagar are empty and when dust settles in Lal Chowk? If not, this movement is on its way towards failure. Hate me for saying this, but that’s the anatomy of popular movements. Politics, after all, is determined by forces that are historically contingent. 

Kashmiri leadership behaves like the proverbial frog in the well: they think that the rest of the world has the patience to be continually worried about their struggle, their politics, and their timelines. They behave as if they and their protests can exist independent of whatever happens in the rest of the world – and so much is happening in the wider world and in the neighborhood - and that their people will always be out on the streets at their beck and call irrespective of whether they do their homework or not. 

The ongoing movement is overwhelmingly participated by a new crop of people among you who do not belong to the generation of the 1980s. The concerns, issues and dreams of this new generation are different from the earlier generation. The leadership has largely remained stagnant while the followers are mostly different. Those new ones among you should ask whether your leadership knows what lies ahead in this struggle. Do they know what their endgame is? Have they told you how they are going to achieve it, if they have one? Or are they using this unexpected outpouring of popular emotions to settle their petty scores, strengthen their leadership positions, rise to prominence, and take on the mainstream politicians without any vision or mission? Does the coordination committee or do the leaders therein have a futuristic blueprint of what a future Kashmir would look like? What an “azad” Kashmir would look like? Do you see this as a secular nationalist struggle or do you want to build an Islamised Kashmir? How are the dissident leaders different from the mainstream politicians and politics of Kashmir which they so fiercely fight to resist? 

(Source: Greater Kashmir, October 1, 2008. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=1_10_2008&ItemID=3&cat=11 )

Does he mean business?

Zardari’s ‘Business Plans’ with India

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

Asif Ali Khan Zardari, the newly elected President of Pakistan, lacks in popular legitimacy. He is still known to a large number of common Pakistanis and committed cadres of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) as the widower of their favorite leader. In other words, President Zardai’s only claim to fame so far is his marriage to late Benazir Bhutto even as there are many reasons why he is infamous. As the President of Pakistan, he would like to do a radical make-over of his political and personal images and he knows that he can easily do so by making some radical political decisions. After all, politics is the game of the present. Pakistani leaders can make history by either whipping up passions against India or by making unprecedented peace moves towards India. While it may be too early to say that is what Zardari will do in the days to come, one can surely say that that is what he is aiming to do in the days to come. Let’s look at some evidence in this regard.

As soon as he was sworn in as the county’s 12th President in Islamabad, Zardari made three key foreign policy overtures all of which are important for India. First of all, contacts with the Indian government, he said, were underway and that the people would soon hear good news about Kashmir (possibly in a matter of months since he said that the good news will be there before UPA goes into elections next year). Secondly, he was unequivocally indicating that Pakistan needs to have a good friend in Afghanistan and he sent that message out by inviting the Afghan President for his swearing in ceremony. Hamid Karzai commented at the post-swearing in press conference, “I find in President Zardari a good will and vision not only for relations between the two countries but for the region that I have seen for the first time in this region” (emphasis added). That these comments came from someone who has been openly accusing the Pakistani government of sponsoring the militant attacks in his country shows the way ahead between the two countries. Thirdly, Zardari said the government now has a strategy in place to combat terrorism and added that he himself remained a victim of terrorism. He further said, “the challenge for us is to dismantle the militant cells so that they do not hold the foreign policies of two independent nations (India and Pakistan) hostage to their acts of terrorism.”

His recent comments on Kashmir as the president of Pakistan should be seen in continuation of what he had said earlier about Kashmir and his clarification regarding that later on. After the Zardari-led PPP had come to power in Pakistan, Zardari said that Kashmir should be kept on the backburner, that his government wants to improve its relations with India, and would not let the Jammu and Kashmir dispute become an obstacle in the friendly relations between the two countries: “We can be patient till everybody grows up further and leave the Kashmir dispute for the future generations to resolve in atmosphere of trust”. When this statement was criticized by pro-Kashmiri leaders in Pakistan he clarified that he is committed to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. He made it clear, again, in March this year when some of us had met him at the Zardari House in Islamabad as part of the Pugwash delegation that he is ready to talk about Kashmir, ready to think out of the box in order to resolve the issue and that he is ready to ‘do business’ with India on Kashmir. He explained what he meant by doing business with India saying that his government will take steps to establish mutually beneficial commercial and economic projects in the erstwhile princely state of J&K in consultation with the government of India. He said that the future of Kashmir should be seen in terms of a bridge of commerce and trade and other mutually beneficial interactions between the two counties.

I do not see Zardari’s statements on Kashmir as impulsive utterances of a shrewd politician trying to impress the audience of the day. Over the last few months he has elaborated on his plans for Kashmir on more than one occasion. He made two important statements recently prior to assuming the presidency of the country. “Pending a final settlement, we agree with the statement of your Prime Minister supporting an autonomous Kashmir running much of its own affairs”, Zardari said to an Indian media organisation. He further said that a Commission can be established between the two countries and the “leaders of Kashmir themselves to work out what should be done in foreign and defence affairs”. After he became President, he said that he has been consulting key leaders in Pakistan regarding Kashmir policy and that a parliamentary committee will soon be set up to discuss all possible solutions to resolve the Kashmir issue.

The timing of his statement, as president, on Kashmir assumes significance because he did not choose to lash out against India especially at a time when there are anti-India protests raging in the Kashmir valley. This is indicative of the political maturity of his vision for Kashmir and for India-Pakistan relations.

Should Zardari’s statements on Kashmir be taken seriously? If so why? First of all, he is a smart businessman and is keen to make his mark in Pakistan’s polity and so he is likely to think out of the box on Kashmir. Secondly, given the situation that Pakistan is currently in (fall from the US grace, dubbed by the international community as the epicenter of global terrorism, multiple insurgencies at home etc.), it is likely to adopt a conciliatory approach to India and other players in the region. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, he is a moderate, modern and progressive Muslim, and not a fanatic and so will understand the rules of the modern states system.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, September 17, 2008. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=17_9_2008&ItemID=14&cat=11 )

Greater common good

Dissidents Need a Common Minimum Programme

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

The question that many, including in J&K, are asking today is whether the dissident leadership in the state knows what it wants. One is not sure if they have indeed arrived at a consensual blueprint, behind closed doors, as to what their endgame is going to be. It doesn’t look they have a blueprint, going by the statements of various leaders, trajectory of the movement, shifting stances of the various dissident formations and the incongruence between the mood of the public and the deeds of the leaders. The leaders of the ongoing dissident struggle in Kashmir have come from a wide range of political formations, shades of opinion and political persuasions and have therefore shown no great deal of unity of purpose in the ongoing struggle. Added to this is the simmering dissent within the dissident camp that has now become fairly clear. First of all, Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s claim to ‘sole leadership’ has not gone down very well with the other leaders and they have expressed that in many words. Secondly, Geelani and his disciples are ostensibly spearheading the ongoing struggle for azadi. Moreover, his camp seems to be making both the grand strategy and tactics of the ongoing struggle. What this means is that even if others do not know what their endgame is, Geelani does.

More importantly, Geelani’s recent statements about other Kashmiri dissident leaders and questioning their credentials have not gone down well with the rest of them. What this dissent in the dissident camp will do, slowly but steadily, is to weaken the momentum of the ongoing agitations. One of the reasons why the other leaders do not seem to be contesting Geelani’s modus operandi is because it will not be tolerated by the common Kashmiris who are participating in the protests: they would like to see their leaders united and they see Geelani as the grand old patriarch who can provide the necessary symbolism to the ongoing agitations. Anyone who shows dissent in the dissident camp today would most definitely have his political career cut short.

So while this apparent ‘unity’ will sustain, under the circumstances, the ongoing agitations in the days to come without any serious ruptures, what this will deprive the ‘movement’ is a unity of purpose. First of all, they need to have a commonly worked out scheme on how to talk with New Delhi and secondly, what to demand from New Delhi. At present there does not seem to be any serious formal or backchannel efforts to engage New Delhi. If the dissidents believe that they can sustain the momentum of the agitations for as long as they wish, they are mistaken: popular movements invariably have their lifespan. It is advantage dissident camp at this point of time, but then the ball is in their court too: they need to make their demands loud and clear. One of the reasons for this lack of common demand is that different leaders in the dissident camp believe in different things. While Geelani may be having a field day with his leadership, ideas, and ideology, ruling the roost today, there are other equally competing ideologies within Kashmir’s dissident camp. Consider for example: one of the slogans that one gets to hear rather frequently during the ongoing agitations is: Ham Pakistani Hain, Pakistan Hamara Hai (We belong to Pakistan, and Pakistan belongs to us). Apart from Geelani, not many would agree with this slogan but even then they don’t seem to be in a position to speak up against that.

If the aim of the agitations so far was to create conditions to force New Delhi to listen to the Kashmiris regarding innovative and out-of-the-box solutions to resolve the issue, they have undoubtedly achieved that and now the time has come for them to reach a consensual and workable solution. Can the dissident camp continue the present momentum and have a unity of purpose at the same time? They can, provided they decide upon a ‘common minimum programme’ while the agitations are in their prime. This requires a willingness on the part of the dissident leadership to do some collective and realistic strategising. As this writer has pointed out in earlier columns in GK, there are indeed many common themes in the opinions of the Kashmiri dissident leadership regarding what the future of Kashmir should be. While it is true that the wide range of dissident opinions ranging from merger with Pakistan to greater autonomy, the middle-of-the-road solution between the two extremes seems to be the restoration of the provisions of an undiluted Article 370.

The significance of ‘Achievable Nationhood’

One of the key documents that need to be carefully examined by the dissident camp today is the much acclaimed Achievable Nationhood produced by People’s Conference led by Sajad Lone. Lone’s document not only makes a realistic assessment of the situation in J&K but also proposes innovative methods to address the feelings and needs of the people of J&K. While some of his solutions might be beyond the brief of Article 370, one must understand that, this is a document that is open to be put to discussion, deliberations and, perhaps, amends to suit the needs of the various constituencies in the state. The importance of this document lies in its inherent flexibility to address the aspirations of various actors and so the dissident leadership needs to give serious consideration to this document in order to lay out a common minimum programme which is perhaps a must at this point of time.

An afterthought

Even as the anti-India protests are gaining in strength in Kashmir, India’s National Security Advisor M K Narayanan was sent by New Delhi’s political leadership to assess the security situation in Srinagar and report back. Those accompanied included the Defence Secretary, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Director of Intelligence Bureau and a Joint Secretary at the Prime Minister’s Office. There were no politicians in this high level delegation and, for that matter, no senior political leader from New Delhi has visited the valley ever since the protests began there. This shows that New Delhi still prefers to look at it as a law and order and security problem and not a political problem. More importantly, why do New Delhi’s politicians shy away from engaging the people and dialoging with them when it matters the most? Politics, our politicians need to understand, is not a bed of roses.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, September 3, 2008: URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=3_9_2008&ItemID=3&cat=11)