Wednesday, August 13, 2008

This marks the end of yet another peace process?

STATECRAFT BY HAPPYMON JACOB

There appears to be an increasing possibility of history repeating itself yet again vis-à-vis the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan: a long eventful history that has recorded relative clam and mutual animosity in succession. Even as the peace process is officially on, there does not seem to be much peace left in it. Events in the past months seem to have got the better off the four-year-old peace process and the five-year-old ceasefire. This comes at a time when yet another important peace process – between J&K and the Indian government – seems to be going down the drain. The internal peace process that had raised the hopes of many in the subcontinent now seems to be losing steam. Indeed, the relationship between New Delhi and Srinagar as well as Jammu and Srinagar seems to be worsening by the hour. While the two peace processes – India-Pakistan and New Delhi-Srinagar – are two sides of the same coin, they have different rationale, dynamics, pulls and pressures, and endgames.

The last few months have been eventful and testy for India-Pakistan relations and their peace initiatives. The recent history of India-Pakistan relationship was characterised by increasing infiltration from across the border, reported incidents of firing across the LoC which both countries chose to ignore until recently in order to continue the peace process, deadly attack on the Indian mission in Kabul which had clear ISI signature (say Indian and US intelligence agencies), and the serial bombings in Bangalore and Ahamadabad that pointed fingers towards Pakistan. After all of this, the Indian government decided that there was no way that the peace process could go on as if nothing had happened.
It was against this background that the foreign ministers and prime ministers of the two countries met in Colombo on the sidelines of the SAARC summit to discuss ways and means to salvage the peace process that was dying a sad and untimely death. However, not to the surprise of many analysts, nothing significant came out of this meeting. While the Indian government engaged in some plain speaking and hard diplomacy, Pakistani side was trying to save face (as the entire SAARC community seemed to be talking passionately about the need to contain terror in the region) by sounding conciliatory and pointing out the Pakistani decision to expand the positive list of items for import from India and to begin the process of inviting Indian firms to invest in Pakistan. This, however, did not seem to have cut much ice with the Indian side.
That said, let us go back a step further to seek answers and explanations for what is happening to the peace process. Despite the fact that there is widespread popular support for the peace process and that Indians and Pakistanis, in general, want to see that the two south Asian neighbours live in peace and harmony, the peace process is only going downhill. What explains this contradiction between popular desire and official actions? Furthermore, what explains the official lines and actual results?
First of all, there is some merit in the argument that the current crisis in India-Pakistan relations is part of the age-old diversionary war strategy, even as that alone cannot explain the present stalemate. As per this theory, a country adopts a belligerent posture vis-à-vis another country when faced with too many pressing domestic concerns, such as political turmoil, lack of legitimacy, economic decline, power struggles etc. There are elements of all of these in today’s Pakistan. The president who ruled the country for around 10 years is on the verge of an impeachment (one is unsure of what happens if he is impeached). The failed attempt at reigning in the ISI by trying to put it under civilian control has questioned the authority and power of the political bosses. No one is sure who controls the Pakistani state today: is it the army, is it Musharraf, it is Zardari, is it Prime Minister Gilani or is it sheer anarchy that is ruling Pakistan? The Pakistan army in tandem with the ISI could easily be making use of this political ambiguity at home to press their traditional lines on India and the political leadership in Pakistan (including the Prime Minister and his men) may have decided to be a silent spectator to let the domestic steam out on India.
There is also a widespread view today about Pakistan that it is proceeding towards state failure. While it is certainly not in India’s interest to see a balkanized Pakistan in its neighborhood, one cannot rule out symptoms of state failure in Pakistan. Look at the many regions in today’s Pakistan that are reeling under anarchy. There are varying but increasing degrees of violence, subversion and anarchy in many parts of Pakistan such as the North West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan, to name a few. Incidents of violence in Pakistan have increased manifold during 2003 and 2007. Total number of killed in Pakistan (civilians, security force personnel and terrorists combined) was 189 in 2003, it increased to 863 in 2004, 1471 in 2006 and last year the figure stood at 3599.
Can a country that cannot hold itself together be expected to deliver on the peace process? In order to make sustainable progress on the peace process a country needs to have relative peace and stability at home, which Pakistan unfortunately lacks. This is what the Indian government needs to keep in mind when it demands the Pakistani establishment to deliver on its promises. The Indian government is likely to maintain an aggressive posture in the face of Pakistani inability to act, again, primarily due to domestic political pressures in India. In an election year the Indian government either needs to show that it has achieved a commendable lot on the Pakistan front or adopt a belligerent posture if there are no achievements to show. UPA’s Pakistan policy hasn’t achieved much, so it is unlikely to adopt a soft line now lest that be manipulated by the BJP.
Added to this is the problem that there is an unfortunate absence of any high-level diplomacy or chemistry between the leaders of the two countries: the meeting between Mr. Gilani and Dr. Singh in Colombo was at best cordial in nature, not fruitful. Personal diplomacy often works in international relations and can do wonders when combined with political will and domestic legitimacy. None of these is in existence between the leaders of India and Pakistan as of today.
The immediate future does not look promising unless, of course, the two countries are willing to take some radical steps towards peace. That can, under the circumstances, happen only if there are peace dividends for political use available for both the countries. This, again, seems to be lacking in the case of India and Pakistan. The UPA government, at this point of time, is unlikely to work towards a national consensus months before parliamentary elections and the BJP will not, even if approached, let that happen.