Tuesday, December 29, 2009

Kashmir insurgency, 20 years after

HAPPYMON JACOB

The Hindu, December 25, 2009.


Vehicles with goods cross the Aman Sethu on way to Muzaffarabad near the LoC. Photo: Nissar Ahmad
The Hindu


Vehicles with goods cross the Aman Sethu on way to Muzaffarabad near the LoC. Photo: Nissar Ahmad



The contours of the tussle have changed in a fundamental manner over the years, but both the conflict ‘in’ Kashmir and the conflict ‘over’ Kashmir continue.

December 2009 marks 20 years of the insurgency in Kashmir. During this period, Kashmir has metamorphosed -- in terms of its politics, discourse, the nature of the militancy, the level of external intervention and perceptions of the potential solutions. Yet, much of India’s understanding of Kashmir remains ensnared in the limited confines of history, and thus India fails to understand the changes, declines to advance from age-old positions, and refuses to look for fresh ways to address the conflict.

What has changed since 1989? Let us compare the big picture, then and now. In 1989, India found itself on the losing side of the Cold War with hardly a friend in the international community. More so, the international community was negatively disposed towards India vis-À-vis the Kashmir issue. Pakistan was optimistic after having been part of the alliance that had defeated the Soviet Union in the Afghan war and was confident of its ability and standing in the region. The Kashmiri dissidents, Pakistan and the militants in Kashmir had managed to ‘internationalise’ their cause and garnered significant levels of sympathy for it. India was being pushed into a corner.

This is no more the case. India is increasingly referred to as an emerging power and is considered a key stabilising player in the South Asian subcontinent. The international community is no longer keen to discuss Kashmir or force a solution; it knows India will not be pushed. The stress is now on India and Pakistan finding their own answers, and not much attention is being given to the wishes of the Kashmiris themselves. Furthermore, unlike in the late-1980s, Pakistan is a much-weakened power now without many reliable strategic partners. The state is widely feared to be heading for failure due to its ingrained promotion of terrorism. Kashmir is no more a pet issue for the international community. There are more pressing issues at hand.

Pakistan has clearly foundered over Kashmir. In fact, its strategy vis-À-vis India in general has gone wrong and has backfired terribly. Many of the elements Pakistan supported in an effort to “liberate” Kashmir from India have turned against it. More significantly, Pakistan has seemingly lost the direction of its foreign policy. Contradictory statements on Kashmir abound, rendering the country’s position confusing and ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to a realisation among some people in Pakistan that it needs to think beyond Kashmir, and that it is self-defeating to continue the fight. This has important implications for the conflict.

In India, too, the discourse on Kashmir has changed drastically. The country’s mainstream discourse traditionally considered the issue as one driven and created purely by Pakistani interference. Everyone seemed oblivious to the fact that Pakistan had been given the space for this interference due to India’s traditional mishandling of Kashmir. This mainstream thinking was infused in the media discourse. Bollywood films and popular writing portrayed Kashmir as a terrorism-infested region that needs to be cleansed of Pakistani agents. It tended to draw a picture of Kashmiris as supporters of terrorism and Pakistan. This thinking is undergoing a positive transformation. Today there is a growing awareness about the nuances of the Kashmir problem, and about the follies the Indian state has committed there. There is an understanding of the pervasive sense of alienation among Kashmiris and a growing realisation that anti-India protests are not necessarily pro-Pakistan. There is the realisation that there is a real problem in Kashmir that needs a political resolution.

Over the years, Kashmiri views on Pakistan have changed. Although many people in Kashmir never wanted it to become part of Pakistan, there were some who thought they would be better off there. Moreover, given the negative light in which many Kashmiris often saw India, there was a tendency, even if not so widespread, to view Pakistan with sympathy and admiration. This is changing, thanks to the existential problems that Pakistan is facing, the atrocities that Pakistan-sponsored terrorists have committed in Kashmir, and the general perception that joining Pakistan may not be the best option for Kashmir. As a result, there are fewer Pakistan supporters in the Valley today, and even fewer of them for militants coming from Pakistan to “liberate Kashmir from Indian tyranny.”

Kashmiri politics today is multi-faceted and more vibrant than ever. Analysts and observers tend to get confused while writing about the State primarily because they struggle to appreciate the often contradictory nature of today’s political environment. The people of Kashmir are learning to speak two contrasting languages at once: one of dissidence, and the other of mainstream issues. Many analysts argued that India lost Kashmir during the protests against the Amarnath land transfer. Likewise, many argued after last year’s elections in Jammu and Kashmir (when more than 62 per cent of the people voted as compared to around 43 per cent in 2002) that the historic referendum was the last nail in the coffin of separatist politics and ‘azadi’ sentiments in the Valley. Both arguments failed to understand the complexity of the politics in Kashmir or appreciate that political affairs there have changed fundamentally.

The ‘mainstreaming of dissent’ is another phenomenon in contemporary Kashmir. Gone are the days when the separatists were an untouchable lot. Today, separatist politics and ‘azadi’ sentiments are more nuanced, more complex than before and take many forms, ranging from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP would object to being called ‘pro-azadi,’ ‘separatist’ or even ‘soft-separatist,’ yet the fact remains that it walks a very fine line. On the one hand, the self-rule proposal put forward by it asks for more than what the Constitution of India promises the State and is closer to the platform proposed by separatist leaders (such as Sajjad Lone). On the other, the PDP has a political constituency that speaks the language of both separatism and ‘azadi.’ Yet, having ruled the State for three years, the PDP is a mainstream Kashmiri political party with clear links to the Indian state. On the other side of the divide, the dissident APHC often raises governance-related issues. This crossing of traditional political boundaries by the hitherto opposed political groups indicates the complexity of Kashmir’s new politics.

The meaning of ‘azadi’ has also grown in complexity over the last 20 years, becoming more nuanced and developing more shades of meaning, which many analysts fail to recognise. It would not be wrong to say that the aspirations for freedom — the ‘azadi’ sentiment — were strong in Kashmir when the insurgency began. However, 20 years on, this sentiment is more refined today; ‘azadi’ does not always mean self-determination in popular parlance now. ‘Azadi’ today means freedom from the fear of militants and security forces, as well as dignity and self-respect, self-governance, and the absence of New Delhi’s perceived political high-handedness.

Many and multifarious pathways aimed at reconciliation have emerged. Although the India-Pakistan peace process is currently on ice, the Srinagar-New Delhi conversation is very much alive. There are dialogues taking place between Jammu and Srinagar as well as among Muzaffarabad and Srinagar and Jammu. Traders from both sides of the State have established a joint J&K Chamber of Commerce and Industries. While many of these ‘peace tracks’ need to be revived, their very existence shows the fundamental manner in which the conflict has been transformed from the time violence permeated the State.

While it is true that its contours have changed in a fundamental manner, it is also true that both the conflict in Kashmir and the conflict over Kashmir continue to exist. The stakeholders must show more determination and enthusiasm to engage each other and discover a solution. However, to do so they must first acknowledge Kashmir’s metamorphosis.

(Source, The Hindu, December 25, 2009. URL: http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article70073.ece?homepage=true )

Comments on the article published on the Hindu website:

COMMENTS:

Opinion of Kashmir people has been swaying towards India even though our politicians had botched the policies in the past as result which terrorists, dissidents were deeply rooted in this area. Even though we are on the way to becoming global power, our foreign diplomacy had failed. India must encourage liberal society in the state and also look to the economic development of common people.

from: nilesh salpe
Posted on: Dec 25, 2009 at 00:48 IST

It is imperative to establish the fact that India believes in preserving & maintaining the Kashmiriat as an identity of all Kashmiris irrespective of their faith but within the Indian federal system.

from: BALA SRINIVASAN.
Posted on: Dec 25, 2009 at 01:19 IST

Excellent.

from: sunil babu
Posted on: Dec 25, 2009 at 09:57 IST

Excellent analysis of Kashmir issue, and a timely reminder that new approach and perspective is required towards it.

from: Nimish Pandey
Posted on: Dec 25, 2009 at 12:12 IST

While the article captures the problem in right spirit but it fails to understand the complexities of the problem. 'Azadi' sentiments in the Valley are real, in fact they have grown religious as well, thanks to ever growing religious fanaticism in South Asia. I can't provide a solution to Kashmir problem, but I am certain that, in order to solve it, we have to begin from our home. We must suppress religious fanaticism growing in India. I may sound pessimistic when I say that Kashmir problem will also not be solved, if the relevant people do not understand the position of India, and try to look for breakthrough in dialogues. Current political leadership in Kashmir demanding something, in one way or other, which they will never get from Indian state/people. Thus they are delaying the resolution of the problem, and worst of all making the life of common people in the Valley miserable.

from: Naveen Kumar
Posted on: Dec 25, 2009 at 21:44 IST

It is a nicely squared up article on the Kashmir but lacking the basic address of the stark realities.
(1) After partition, though the division took place on religious grounds as far as Pakistan concerned, yet India generously reformed itself into a proud 'Secular, Socialist, Democratic Republic' and we are happy that the Muslims have happily lived and flourished here in contrast to our neighbouring Pakistan and Bangladesh.
(2) It is well known that this whole mess of Kashmir was initiated by Jinnah's invasion in October 1947 illegally, causing further bloodshed and the lingering legacy of what we call today"Kashmir Problem". Of course, mistakes has been committed by Indian leadership too, for which we are paying the price till date.
(3) Whenever we talk of Kashmir problem, why does it exclusively imply the Kashmir valley alone? Is it that it is kept all the time volatile by a particular section of people? Are we affraid of recognising the truth behind the existing problem? This is what has kept it so long lingering, in my mind.
(4) If the same short sightedness that created the problem in 1947 is not borne in mind now, the real peace in the valley may still be alluding. In the name of the Secular Democracy, all the players involved must be expected to be sympathetic to each other.
(5) The PDP Inc is, in my opinion far more dangerous than those openly opposing. His inconsistent and variable statements, even pro-pakistan at times are very worrying. His talks smack of undisclosed agendas through POK leadership. vide this URL from POK:http://paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?222557

This is an interview of recently elected so called PM of POK, Mr Raja Md Farooq Khan published in Pak Tribune on Monday, 20 December 2009. I
try to assure myself of the loyalty of my Muslim brothers in India, they seem to betray me repeatedly. For example, Mufti Md Saheb recently attempted to cross the LoC for consultation with this same leader whose URL I have provided you above.It is self explanatory.
(6)The recent question asked to Rahul Gandhi at AMU by a young female
student at the campus,"When do you think India will have a Muslim Prime Minister". These and the recent decision by JUH at their controversial annual meeting against the Vande Mataram was distasteful. I do not object to what they do not like, but the manner of dislike to create a cause for communal rift is despicable. That is what is my point. The Muslims should start feeling themselves Indians now and why should they doubt it? I would rather suggest and compare the religious position in India and Pakistan and Bangladesh. The answer will be immediately apparent.
There are a lot more issues but this tip of Iceberg should suffice to highlight the historical legacy in this subcontinent. I may have sounded anti-minority, but the majority should not be completely marginalised of their rights too. Both the minority and majority have their equal responsibility to each other. We must and must not try to run away from this apparent truth.

With no apology and equally with no malice to none, but in the interest of the lasting Indian Democracy. A conscious citizen.

Dr. O. P. Sudrania

from: Dr. O. P. Sudrania
Posted on: Dec 26, 2009 at 01:47 IST

The ground realities are very different. What the Indian/Pakistani public need is the information on both sides of the coin. This will help solve the issue bilaterally. Otherwise, the conflict will be a never ending process being derimental to both the parties

from: Varun
Posted on: Dec 26, 2009 at 05:15 IST

To those of us looking at the Kashmir issue from afar, it symbolizes two things: India's courage of conviction (in democracy and plurality) and Pakistan's failed policy of using extremism as a proxy war tactic. Now it is India's turn to create opportunities for Kashmiris to progress and restore the pride of the land though rehabilitation and strong human rights enforcement.

from: Steve
Posted on: Dec 26, 2009 at 08:47 IST

India,and for that matter Pakistan too, have lost hundreds of years of development due to colonialisation. Peace and progress is the need now. With the wrong priorities we weaken each other and allow external forces to fish in the troubled waters.

from: Vinod Kongot Nair
Posted on: Dec 27, 2009 at 03:09 IST




Thursday, November 5, 2009

The limits of coercive diplomacy

Happymon Jacob

The so-called ‘peace overture’ that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made to Pakistan from the Kashmir Valley last week, came almost a year after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks and New Delhi’s subsequent indefinite halt of the peace process with Islamabad. The major dialogue channels between the two countries — the composite dialogue and the back-channel negotiations — continue to remain closed. Since November 2008, there have only been some underdeveloped and half-hearted attempts towards a thaw in the prevailing icy state of relations between the two countries. There seems to be no way forward.

However, following mounting international pressure and an increasing number of jihadist attacks on its soil, including an audacious assault on the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and a series of attacks on police installations in Lahore, Pakistan has urged a resumption of dialogue with India. Dr. Singh’s peace overture has come at a time when there is an urgent need to re-examine India’s policy of ‘no-dialogue’ with Pakistan.

Has it worked?

It is perhaps an opportune time to ask whether the Indian strategy of coercive diplomacy has worked against Pakistan. What has India gained by not talking to Pakistan for 11 months, and what more is India likely to gain if it continues along this path? Do New Delhi’s foreign policy mandarins think India profits strategically by refusing to engage Pakistan in discussion?

Do they assume that India can indefinitely retain the moral high ground it thought it had when it broke off relations with Pakistan last year? They seem to hold this assumption, erroneous though this might be. As a result, New Delhi is not only losing precious time by isolating itself from Pakistan, but is harming its own strategic interests.

India has achieved all it can hope to with its silence; there is nothing more it can reasonably hope to gain by refusing to restart the dialogue process. Pakistan has accepted that the perpetrators of 26/11 came from its territory and has, in principle at least, agreed to prosecute them. India also helped focus the attention of the international community on Pakistan post-26/11. However, New Delhi’s insistence that it will talk to Islamabad only after Jama’at-ud-Da’wah (JuD) chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed is prosecuted may indeed be demanding too much. India should work with Pakistan to initiate Saeed’s prosecution rather than hounding Islamabad to go it alone: a strategy of pure coercion and compellence with no reasonable payoff is clearly counterproductive.

If New Delhi continues along this route, Pakistan may well up the ante against India (through border incursions, for example) in an attempt to bring India to the negotiating table: states have a tendency to behave irrationally when pushed to the corner. India’s strategy of compellence has never really worked against Pakistan. And it is unlikely to work in the future.

Counterproductive

Not only is a ‘no-dialogue’ policy towards Pakistan not useful, it is indeed counterproductive. Consider the following. First of all, the former Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, is increasingly becoming a ‘persona non-grata’ among the ruling elites of Pakistan — both civilian and military. There is an emerging tendency among many Pakistani politicians and retired generals who once worked under Gen. Musharraf, to feign ignorance of his statements and actions (especially vis-À-vis India) and to distance themselves from him.

In other words, there is today a clear unwillingness in Pakistan to own the political legacy of its former military dictator. It is now widely recognised that the 2004-2008 peace process — which was seriously considering out-of-the-box solutions to resolve outstanding rifts — not only had the full support of Dr. Singh and Gen. Musharraf but, through its back-channel route, had even prepared a tentative blueprint for peace. More precisely, it is believed that the bilateral back-channel negotiations had taken the peace process on Jammu and Kashmir to a new level. If the new government and the strategic community in Pakistan renege on Gen. Musharraf’s past promises, there will be serious implications for Indo-Pakistan relations, especially with respect to Kashmir.

Therefore, undoing Gen. Musharraf’s legacy will also mean undoing the Indo-Pakistan peace process and all that it may have achieved over time. If this process of demonising and demolishing Gen. Musharraf’s legacy is already under way in Pakistan, then India’s consistent refusal to engage Islamabad will only further contribute to the undoing of the gains of the Indo-Pakistan peace process. In other words, the Indian unwillingness to engage Pakistan will reverse the gains that India had made in recent years in resolving its conflicts with Pakistan.

Another emerging trend in Pakistan is to accuse India of sponsoring terrorism against Pakistan. Today many in the Pakistan establishment are making serious allegations that India supports the Baloch insurgents as well as some Pakistan Taliban groups. While such allegations may not be wholly new, what is perhaps new is the focussed and predetermined manner in which these accusations are being made today and the manner in which this argument is gaining currency within Pakistan’s strategic elite. Although this may be purely for domestic consumption — as the international audience is unlikely to buy this line of argument — a Pakistani population and civil society unfavourably disposed towards India is not something New Delhi should ignore. It will be genuinely counterproductive for Indian interests in the long term.

More so, this shows that there is a perceptible change in Pakistan’s attitude: from being defensive and cornered in the months immediately after 26/11, it is now on the offensive. To some extent this has been a result of India’s overuse of coercive diplomacy, which it continues to indulge in without properly weighing its options in a cost-effective manner. Quite apart from the fact that this approach has degraded relations between the two countries and made Pakistan feel more insecure (which in turn may prompt it to be more belligerent), it has led the international community to regard the two countries as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. More so, the more time India spends refusing to have a dialogue with Pakistan, the more difficult it will be for the country to start talking if and when it decides to talk.

Status quo bias

New Delhi’s unwise handling of Pakistan is a result of a deep-seated status quo bias that permeates New Delhi’s policy towards Pakistan, terrorism, and even Kashmir which in many ways is the ‘ground zero’ of Indo-Pakistan relations and India’s struggle against terrorism. This status quo bias has manifestly narrowed the Indian government’s understanding and approach to terrorism in the region.

New Delhi sometimes appears to consider terrorism a problem that is unique to India, as though no other country has ever suffered its consequences. It therefore persists with its demand that others (that is, Pakistan) ‘fix’ the problem first before it (the perpetual victim) will discuss other political and security issues.

This head-in-the-sand approach ignores the reality that terrorism is a global/regional problem requiring a global/regional solution. This solution can only be achieved in a cooperative mode and by creating cooperative mechanisms to contain the menace of terror in the region. And India needs to take the lead in this process, however challenging and long-drawn-out it may turn out to be. It is imprudent to attempt to enact unilateral measures to ‘control’ terrorism, precisely because terrorists respect no borders and are by their very nature extremely difficult to control.

A status quo bias may ‘benefit’ the painfully slow-moving Indian political and bureaucratic apparatus, but it is not beneficial for a country that desires to become a great power in an age of fast-changing international politics. To start with, therefore, New Delhi needs to shed its status quo bias and restart the dialogue with Pakistan in its own long-term strategic interests.

(Source: The Hindu, November 4, 2009. URL: http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article42838.ece)

COMMENTS:

After all the dialogues we indulged with Pakistan since 1947 there has been no significant shift in policies or view points of both the countries.The best solution for India is to stop giving undue importance to Pakistan and focusing more on problems at home. Terrorism that has emerged in names of naxalites, Maoists and many other groups as a result of neglect and weak character of Indian governments has to be controlled first if India desires to achieve a Super Power status ever in future.I agree with the author in the matter that Indian government should stop whining about how Indians have been a victim of Pakistan sponsored Terrorism.We should rather focus on creating a feeling of security by improving the intelligence services and infrastructure for defense and paramilitary forces so that they can effectively counter the militias all over the country.Instead of a dialogue with Pakistan, India can gain more by initiating a dialogue with its own people who have taken up arms.

from: Vinayak
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 02:21 IST

India needs to maintain current status of any talks with Pakistan. Why do we forget that the main culprit named by the arrested Terrorist, providing cogent evidence agaisnt him, is still at large enjoying official support. Evidence provided by India is being either denied or is being rated insufficient. The more we adopted soft diplomakcy to Pakistan the more terrorists landed in India, including Jammu and Kashmir. Government of India, for the first time, as taken right decision to ask Pakistan to first prosecute the main culprit roaming at large before sitting on the dialogue table. We should appreciate the Government's approach which is in overall National interest.

from: Arjoo
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 08:19 IST

Wonderfully written!

from: Mahmood
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 08:23 IST

The author makes some valid points, but looses sight of the larger goal. Talks will help when actions or agreements result. In the case of Pakistan, the main problem is that once the leadership changes (and this seems to happen a lot), the "Talks" have to start again from square one, with all the agreements already concluded deemed worthless. In the current scenario, it does not appear anyone is in control in Pakistan (so no actions possible either).

from: Pradeep
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 10:28 IST

I have to disagree that India needs to pay its unruly neighbour so much attention. India must crush Pakistan's overtures by ignoring it as much as possible, not giving it the level playground it covertly seeks through terrorism.

from: B S Kumar
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 10:32 IST

I don't agree. India should continue to be firm in its position that there will be no talks until the 26/11 terrorists are prosecuted. If Pakistan is really sincere in improving its relations with India, it must do at least the one thing that India is asking for. If it cannot fulfill this one request, how can we be sure it will fulfill other requests made during any future talks? It is Pakistan's credibility at stake here, and there is no need for India to rush to restart talks. Restarting talks for talks sake is futile and everybody knows it. Let's be patient but firm and consistent in our position.

from: Kiran A
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 10:58 IST

While there is no doubt that dialogue can sort out issues across the world, there is a worry India should have to start the same. As one should have noticed in the past, whenever there was an atmosphere created for dialogue, the terrorists had always made hurdles. So if India really want to start the dialogue, let it happen and if there is no agenda, then let it now happen. If one really wants to go and get the issues solved, both these countries should have an open and negotiation mind to start with. Because Paistan can't ask India to hand over entire Kashmir to them, India won't agree to it. Likewise, India should also not insist that we are going to resume the dialogue like our predecessors... If there is no solutions foreseen, then it is better not to have dialogue rather than a failed dialogue.

from: Umesh
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 12:27 IST

India Pakistan relations have always been governed by emotions and events, whether it is Plebscite offering by nehru, shimla agreement , nuclear bomb etc. Every single event or word spoken or action taken has become a cornerstone in deciding future course of action. To make coercive diplomacy successful again, India should talk really tough and not give in as it did at Sharm-el-Sheikh by admitting to look at Balooch accusations. Historical mistakes need not be repeated, else it will harm us in long term.

from: Amit Kumar
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 12:32 IST

I agree with the assessment that coercive diplomacy has all but failed. The US only plays to its self-interest in any region. India has never really stood up to itself in its actions against Pakistan and is seen more as a whiner. The time when we make strong words supported by meaningful action, our aspiration for a super power will be realised. As to the specific re-engagement with Pakistan, it does India no harm in opening channels of back-door diplomacy. But it can be futile with an instable Pak Govt and insecure country.

from: Nandith Nedungadi
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 13:59 IST

I think that the author has been very right in his optimistic attitude for better India-Pak relations. But, i guess the author misses the point that if what is happening in Pakistan now-a-days persists sometime longer, there would be no Pakistan to talk about. The International community has changed their views towards Muslims, which is really a sad thing, people see them as terrorists, everyone and this is because some of them are doing it. I think India can't achieve the Super Power status until and unless it has its issues resolved with Pakistan. But again starting the peace process is not a solution.

from: Ravi
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 14:06 IST

Considering the status quo in Pakistan, Pakistan government and security agencies would be more concerned about their internal security. Mounting pressures to dismantle an entire terror infrastructure may not be a realistic approach from a neighbour like India at this juncture of affairs. It is also true that talks in the current situation may be futile, but being responsible power India needs to resume talks with Pakistan to ensure the state support. An instable Pakistan is a greater threat to India than to themselves.

from: Manu R S
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 14:10 IST

The article could only be construed as a justifier and ground-maker for the to-be announced decision of the Government to carry on the composite dialogues with Pakistan. In the last 62 years, the CBMs ventured by India have only ended in leaving many Indians dead at the hands of terrorists and our intelligence and security forces weakend. India can start, and should, start dialogues only after either the Kashmir problem is solved or when there is a solid proof on the cessation of all terrorism activities that target India in Pakistan.

from: Sakthi
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 14:26 IST

We cannot change our neighbours (neighbouring countries), we have to live with them. Brothers can quarrel sometimes and live apart, but somebody in the family stream should continue to work towards appeasement between the families for a breakthrough in rebuilding the relationship. The misunderstandings of 1947 between the families during our forefathers' period need not have to continue all the way through their grand children and great grand children. We need dialogies between these two great families (India and Pakistan) to come to some good understanding and rejoining. This is the wish of the great great grand children of these two families.

from: Suma
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 14:43 IST

I disagree with the author. You cannot have friendly relations with a country which has throughout history proved to be a backstabber and says that the evidence to frame the terrorists provided by the GoI is not enough!! In the past 10 years itself we faced 3 major attacks by Pakistani terrorists- Kargil War, attack on the parliament and 26/11. I was specially appalled by the following line from the article- ''New Delhi sometimes appears to consider terrorism a problem that is unique to India, as though no other country has ever suffered its consequences.'' Let me point out here that India might not be the only country who had to face the consequences of terrorism but India is the only country who despite of n number of terrorists, anti-Indian elements surrounding the entire border, insurgents, has without a war, diplomatically handled the situation. USA also faced terrorism on it's soil and what did it do? Attack Afghanistan and crumble it to pieces. Instead of applauding the peaceful efforts of the government without waging a war, the author says that India has little to gain by stalling the dialogue process?! My question, what did we gain by resuming it in the first place in 2000? attack on parliament and 26/11..?

from: Jaya Srivastava
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 15:03 IST

I agree with the author that a sensible dialogue is needed from/with Pakistan but NOW is not the time for that.India should wait till the dust settles down there and the signs for peace-making are clearly visible.

from: Senthil Rajan
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 17:23 IST

The broad goals of India's diplomacy should be clear enough: 1. Weaken elements in Pakistan that are violently anti-Indian. 2. Strengthen pro-India elements. The fact that not talking has not achieved this goal does not automatically imply that talking will achieve them. In fact, we could put ourselves in a worse situation by talking. I think both objectives can be achieved if India is able to identify a pro-India element in the Pakistani polity and supporting it consistently. Such element should not be identified with individual persons. India should instead promote concepts like "democracy", "rule of law" and "religious moderation" and be willing to backup any group in Pakistan that embraces these principles. There is no point talking to any government in Pakistan at this time because all of them are controlled by a power structure whose sole aim is to destabilize India. India should create and promote a more friendly atmosphere.

from: Vijay
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 19:03 IST

Coercive diplomacy is just one of the tools of diplomacy. India has used it with limited effect, getting Pakistan to arrest at least the lower level minions of the terrorist infrastructure that has been nurtured there over the past 60 years. It is too early to be called off. In fact, it is not clear that it should ever be called off though it can be re-calibrated. This is not to be confused with the notion that India isn't engaged in interacting with Pakistan. It simply means that sitting down with the Pakistani political leadership at this time would be a wasted effort. Events have proven beyond any doubt that the Pakistani leadership is far too weak to take on the military-bureaucratic establishment that dominates Pakistan. So it suites India to conduct diplomacy that cajoles and prods rather than sits and talks. If there is one important lesson to be learned from engagement with Pakistan, it is that the gains are only possible in conjunction with coercion and force, both diplomatic or military. The 1971 war, the Kargil war and Mumbai terror episode all bear testimony to that simple fact.

from: Gopal
Posted on: Nov 4, 2009 at 19:21 IST

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Manmohan should get a new speechwriter on Kashmir




New Delhi’s deep-seated status-quo bias permeates its policy towards Kashmir which, in many ways, is the ‘ground zero’ of Indo-Pak relations. This status-quo bias has manifestly narrowed the Indian government’s understanding and approach to resolving the problem and has prevented India from taking any radical steps. Although it may ‘benefit’ the painfully slow-moving Indian political and bureaucratic apparatuses, this approach is not beneficial for a country desirous of becoming a great power in an age of fast-changing international politics. The routine manner with which New Delhi approaches Kashmir is disturbing. By not being willing to take radical steps, and granting the state typical bureaucratic treatment, New Delhi is failing the Kashmiris. The PM’s speech in Srinagar shows a lamentable bankruptcy of ideas. Maybe it’s time that Manmohan Singh got a new speechwriter on Kashmir.

Take, for example, the recent visit of the Prime Minister and the Congress Chief to the Kashmir Valley. With the top man in the central government in the lead, the most powerful politician in the country backing him, a friendly and forthcoming state government under Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, and even the major opposition party in J&K, the PDP, welcoming the delegation from New Delhi, what did the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation achieve? Nothing new, nothing substantial. The PM and his delegation made the usual promises, expressed hope (as they always do), claimed there is normalcy in the state (which they have been doing for a very long time), talked about the inclusive dialogue process (that occurred in the UPA’s first term and achieved nothing); and, yes, inaugurated the 12km-long Anantnag-Qazigund railway line. The PM’s speech in Kashmir was a grim reminder of how unimaginative the government has become about conflict resolution in the state. New Delhi’s seasonal theatrics in Kashmir have become all too familiar and predictable in recent years: It’s the same old wine, in the same old bottle.

Home Minister Chidambaram claimed that New Delhi is contemplating the “withdrawal of some paramilitary battalions and vacation of occupied houses and land by the army and paramilitary”. These are the right words, said with the right sentiment, but we have heard similar statements from previous ministers. How are we to believe that this time things will be different and the Kashmiris will get their houses, orchids and schools back? However at least Chidambaram is willing to make such a bold claim; the PM stuck to the tried-and-tested, unwilling to go beyond his speechwriter’s unimaginative rendering of the situation.

Manmohan Singh is credited with making a peace overture to Pakistan from Kashmir that has been hailed as statesmanlike, and as a potential way forward toward reconciliation between India and Pakistan. The essence of what the PM said is that if Pakistan shows good faith and addresses the issue of terrorism, India will not be found wanting in its response. What is so new, different, radical, or statesmanlike in that? Was he not repeating a line that New Delhi has been reiterating for the past 11 months, since the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai? It would have been path-breaking and a real peace overture had the PM made an unconditional offer to talk to Pakistan. I am willing to accept the argument made by many analysts that the PM is serious about restarting the dialogue with Pakistan, but that does not excuse him for his genuinely unsubstantial response to Kashmir.

For many commentators it is politically correct to say that the issue of Kashmir is an issue that is between India and Kashmir and that Pakistan has nothing to do with it. The recently initiated ‘silent diplomacy’ with Kashmiris at the behest of Mr. Chidambaram and the other measures by New Delhi seem to be pointing towards such a direction. What is forgotten here is that there are two important dimensions to the Kashmir problem: the problem of Kashmir and the problem in Kashmir. ‘Silent diplomacy’ will be useful in resolving the problem in Kashmir: poor governance, fear of violence, lack of development, and the army’s occupation of private property, but there is also the problem of Kashmir. The problem of Kashmir exists between India and Pakistan and must also be resolved in order to achieve stability between the two countries, as well as sustainable peace in J&K. Pakistan has in the recent past been reasonable in its declared approaches to the problem of Kashmir. India could legitimately, if cautiously, talk with its neighbour about the issue, rather than consistently trying to isolate Pakistan.

In all of this, one wonders about the exact role that Omar Abdullah has been playing. It looks as though he is increasingly playing second fiddle to the Congress government and that he is endorsing the latter’s peace initiatives. Kashmir’s history bears witness to the fact that J&K chief ministers who have become too close to New Delhi have not excelled in the state. Omar has a mind of his own and should therefore design his own peace initiatives; something he seems hesitant to do thus far. Omar had a vision for Kashmir when he was in opposition that appears to be lacking today. If Omar Abdullah, fired by the enthusiasm of his late thirties, cannot take radical steps now he will never be able to do so, and waiting for New Delhi to do so is proving fruitless.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

(Source: Greater Kashmir, November 3, 2009)

Monday, October 12, 2009

Talk time

Why India Should Start Talking to Pakistan. Now.



Politics is a fast changing game; more so international politics. Though statesmen might want to control and constrain it, they may well be in for a few unpleasant surprises. Statesmen desire to maintain the status-quo if they feel it suits their interests. This often clouds their understanding of international politics, narrowing their perspectives and leaving them uninformed of contemporary realities. New Delhi has traditionally followed an unwise status-quo approach towards Pakistan in its reluctance to engage the country in effective dialogue. Do New Delhi’s foreign policy mandarins think that India profits strategically by refusing to engage Pakistan in discussion? Do they assume that by refusing to engage Islamabad, India can continue to hold the moral high ground it thought it had when it broke off relations post-26/11? They seem to, erroneous though this might be. New Delhi is not only losing precious time by isolating itself from Pakistan, but it is also harming its own strategic interests by doing so. A recent track-two meet in Bangkok between former officials of the countries (from ISI, R&AW, Foreign Ministries, and the Defence Forces) that this author had the chance to attend, exposed some interesting insights into the multifarious negative consequences of giving Pakistan the silent treatment.


First of all, former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraff is increasingly becoming a ‘persona non-grata’ among the ruling elites of Pakistan – both civilian and military. There is now an emerging tendency among many Pakistani politicians and retired generals, who once worked under Musharraff, to feign ignorance of his statements and actions (especially vis-à-vis India) and to distance themselves from him. In short, there is a clear unwillingness in Pakistan to own the political legacy of its former military dictator. This has very serious implications for Indo-Pak relations and the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. It is now widely recognized that the 2004-2008 peace process - which was seriously considering out-of-the-box solutions to resolve the outstanding problems between the two countries – not only had the full support of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and former president Musharraff but, through its back-channel route, had even prepared a tentative blueprint for peace. More precisely, it is believed that the bilateral back-channel negotiations had taken the peace process on J&K to a new level. There was only left to share the progress that had been made with the J&K leadership, both mainstream and dissident, many of whom had already welcomed the ‘Musharraff formula’ as a possible way forward. If the new government and the strategic community in Pakistan renege on Musharraff’s past promises, there will be serious implications for Indo-Pak relations, especially for Kashmir. In other words, undoing Musharraff’s legacy also means undoing the Indo-Pak peace process and all it may have achieved. If this process of demolishing Musharraff’s legacy is already underway in Pakistan, then India’s consistent refusal to engage Islamabad will only further contribute to the undoing of the gains of Indo-Pak peace process.

Another emergent trend in Pakistan is to accuse India of sponsoring terrorism there. The Pakistani government seems to be raising this charge against India in various domestic forums and the strategic community is also singing a similar tune in international meetings. While this may not be a wholly new phenomenon, what is perhaps new is the focused and predetermined manner in which these accusations are being made today. India has been accusing Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism for a long time, and now Islamabad is returning the dubious favour. This may be for purely domestic consumption, as the international audience is unlikely to buy this line of argument, however a Pakistani population unfavourably disposed towards India is not something New Delhi should ignore. It is surely counterproductive for Indian interests in the long term.


What precisely is India gaining by not talking to Pakistan? In my opinion, since severing dialogue with the country post-26/11, India has already achieved whatever it ‘possibly can’. Pakistan has accepted that the perpetrators of 26/11 came from its territory and has agreed to prosecute them. India also managed to turn the heat of the international community on to Pakistan post-26/11. There is nothing more that India can reasonably gain from the current scenario. Insisting that New Delhi will only talk to Pakistan after Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD) chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is prosecuted may be demanding too much. The Indian government should now work with Pakistan to get Sayeed prosecuted rather than trying to force Pakistan to do so alone; a strategy of pure coercion and compulsion with no reasonable payoff is clearly counterproductive. If New Delhi continues along this route, Pakistan may well up the ante against India (through border incursions, for example) in an attempt to bring the latter to the negotiating table. India’s strategy has never worked against Pakistan, and it is unlikely to work in future.

In international relations, ‘signaling’ is an important tactical measure used by countries to engage adversaries without explicitly stating a position. Such signals, unfortunately, frequently go unread. For example, many analysts asserted that the Pakistani army was sending positive signals to India when the ISI chief attended an Iftar celebration hosted by the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. Yet this was not taken seriously by New Delhi. Many in Pakistan’s strategic community today believe that New Delhi should try to engage the Pakistani army – perhaps the real centre of power – in order to resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries. Talking to the Pakistani army is something New Delhi has never considered, but it should now do so.


There is a perceptible change in Pakistan’s attitude: from being defensive and cornered in the months immediately after 26/11, the country today is on the offensive. This has partly been a result of India’s overuse of coercive diplomacy against Pakistan. Quite apart from the fact that it will worsen the relations between the two countries and make Pakistan feel more insecure (which will in turn prompt it to be more belligerent), it will also encourage the international community to continue to consider the two countries as part of the problem. More so, the more time India spends refusing dialogue with Pakistan, the more difficult it will be for the country to start talking as and when it so decides. International politics is a fast-changing game; and New Delhi must improve its strategy if it expects to be a serious and successful player.

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

Source: Greater Kashmir, October 13, 2009. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/today/full_story.asp?Date=13_10_2009&ItemID=45&cat=11