BMD and South Asian strategic stability

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

he logic of nuclear deterrence, at its simplest form, argues that the possession of nuclear weapons by a country would deter its adversary from using a nuclear weapon against it and if the use of nuclear weapons, the most destructive weapons by far, makes no sense when both the adversaries are nuclear armed, the use of conventional weapons makes even less sense. In other words, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to keep a country safe from enemy attacks. A related understanding with regard to nuclear deterrence is that it is premised on a certain level of mutual vulnerability. That is, for nuclear deterrence to continue to exist, the nuclear weapon countries should not try and become invulnerable to the nuclear weapon capability of the adversary. In other words, if India and Pakistan have to continue in a relationship of nuclear deterrence, there should be no attempt by India or Pakistan to build mechanisms to ensure that the other’s nuclear weapons do not land on its territory. Any attempt to do so by either country will not only destroy nuclear deterrence in South Asia but also ensue an arms race that would go far beyond the level, scope and scale of nuclear weapons themselves. 

India’s proposed BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) programme is in a sense doing precisely that – trying to make Pakistani nuclear weapons ineffective against India. Still at the most initial level (even the United States of America has not been able to develop a fool-proof BMD system despite many decades of efforts), the proponents of the Indian BMD programme claim to have developed the capability to protect two Indian cities against incoming Pakistani nuclear-tipped ballistic (not cruise though) missiles. Let alone the fact that the BMD technology is still and unproven one, what is even more worrying is that India’s BMD developments are spearheaded by its defense scientific establishment, not by the civilian political establishment. 

In a report titled as “Government baffled over DRDO chief’s claim on missile shield”, the India Today wrote sometime ago: “The government of India has been baffled by DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat’s repeated claims that a ballistic missile shield is ready for deployment, and that two locations, presumably New Delhi and Mumbai, will be the first recipients of the BMD system. Speaking on a TV programme in early May, Saraswat said that “this system is now ready for induction”. Nearly two weeks later, the claim was repeated in an interview to Press Trust of India where Saraswat was quoted as saying, “The ballistic missile defence shield is now mature… We are ready to put phase I in place.”
Saraswat also argued that “India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites. We are working to ensure space security and protect our satellites. At the same time we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets”.

It is interesting that even as there is a consistent effort underway in India to build Ballistic Missile Defence capability, none of the civilian political leaders has ever made any public statement regarding this, nor has this been discussed in the various subcommittees of the Parliament despite the long term and dangerous implications that the introduction of BMD technology can have for Indo-Pak nuclear deterrence. While the defense technocrats of the country, such as Saraswat, gives out details regarding such strategic programmes from time to time, the civilian bureaucracy or the political class also do not make such statements. While it is easy to argue that members of the civilian bureaucracy or the political class do not understand the technical details of this and hence they do not talk about it, the fundamental reason behind this ‘technology-strategy’ divide is the manner in which technological imperatives are driving India’s strategic decision making. Indeed, this divide between the technological imperatives and the political declarations and posturing is not seen for the first time in the Indian strategic decision making scene. The role of the political class in decision-making in the field of strategic technology weapon systems has always been extremely limited.

Be it the Indian nuclear programme or the ongoing BMD programme, the role of the political class has been extremely limited which is the real cause for concern. I am also one of those who think that there is no clear strategic thinking taking place in New Delhi with regard to the future of India’s security, nuclear strategy or the kind of weapon systems the country should have. If there is no such grand strategic thinking taking place in the first place, it is possible that the government does not really appreciate the long-term implications of the country’s ongoing BMD programme. Optimists argue that India’s unwillingness to clearly state’s its security/defense policies is a clearly thought-out ‘policy of ambiguity’. I belong to the pessimists’ group which contends that there is no strategy behind ambiguity, it is confusion and lack of clear thinking at best. I would go one step further. Decades of ambiguous policy making has indeed landed the Indian state in a position wherein clear thinking about strategic affairs does not come naturally to it: being ambiguous has become part of its very mental makeup. 

Whether or not India actually develops the BMD system eventually, the civilian government - defense scientists divide and the high levels of ambiguity with regard to the BMD system in India can lead Pakistan to adopting a variety of countermeasures. Pakistan, in response to India’s BMD plans, is already carrying out a number of tests of its short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile, Nasr, as it believes that it has the capability to frustrate the BMD capability that India is building. In other words, ‘India’s’ desire to build a BMD system is already witnessing the early stages of a strategic arms race, dangerous and destabilising, in the region. 

(Source: greater Kashmir, 21 APRIL 2013. URL: http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Apr/21/bmd-and-south-asian-strategic-stability-10.asp )

NCTC and India’s federal future

Statecraft

HAPPYMON JACOB

The Chief Ministers’ Conference scheduled to take place in New Delhi tomorrow is unlikely to be the venue where the issue of setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) will be finally settled. Most non-Congress CMs are unlikely to attend the meeting, and even if they attend they may not accept the NCTC proposal even in its new watered-down version. The NCTC saga and its eventual fate, to my mind, is an extremely significant test case that could tell us a great deal about the future of Indian federalism. 

The original NCTC proposal, fiercely opposed by the non-Congress ruled states ranging from Bihar to Tamil Nadu to Gujrat to Tripura, had proposed to locate the NCTC inside the Intelligence Bureau under the Union Home Ministry. It would have the powers to arrest terror suspects anywhere in the country, without prior permission from the state police, and prosecute them. Now imagine a clandestine spy agency, working under the shadows without any accountability, with a ‘glorious’ history of doing the errands of the ruling party in New Delhi, being tasked with arresting and persecuting powers through the length and breadth of the country? The proposed intelligence czar is to be provided with a number datasets containing intelligence collected by various other agencies. All of this will undoubtedly be put to service for ‘political intelligence’ gathering by the ruling party. 

Under severe attack and informed critique from the opposition parties and concerned citizens, the government has now proposed a revised NCTC blueprint. As per the new proposal, NCTC will be directly under the MHA and not under the command of the IB and a nodal officer will be appointed in each State, who could be its police chief, for keeping the States informed of any anti-terror operation. Even this is unlikely to pass the coalition test tomorrow. The UPA government is under Manmohan Singh is simply not in a political position to form any sort of national consensus on the NCTC issue. 
My primary problem with proposals such as the NCTC is that they tend to be anti-people and worryingly less accountable. I am perplexed by the argument often made by those who support extraordinary measures to handle terror: “when terrorists attack with most sophisticated weapons, the state should be allowed to put in place extraordinary measures to address it”. It is ridiculous to equate the state and terrorists. State, and the society that lies at the heart of it, is supposed to be more civilized and enlightened than the terrorists and hence their tools and means to counter terror should be people-friendly and fair, and pass the twin tests of natural justice and modern jurisprudence. 

The supporters of draconian laws to tackle terror also remind us from time to time that we should not politicize the fight against terror. But consider this: whenever there is a terror strike in the country, no matter where, the local police and various Central agencies make it a point to pick up a few muslim youth accusing them of being the masterminds behind the attacks. If they are lucky, the arrested – having undergone humiliation, torture and loss of employment, forget about the terrible years in prison - will be let off by the courts years later for lack of evidence. No compensation offered, no apologies tendered nor are those who made false arrests - and secured promotions and awards for their valorous fight against terror - made accountable. If this is not politicization of the fight against terrorism, what is? Hence, discussion on how and with what we should fight terror is politicization in the right way. 
Given this abysmal record of the state and Central governments’ fight against terror, we should have more than some politically-managed consensus on the issue of NCTC but there should also be wide ranging consultations with various civil society and human rights organisations on an important issue such as this before putting in place such drastic measures. 

Indeed, as mentioned above, the ongoing debate about NCTC would also have deeper implications for the country’s foreign/defense/security policies. To a lot of people, the very fact that the Central government is unable to bring together the state governments to enact the necessary legislation to set up the NCTC is indicative of the deeper policy paralysis that the country is witnessing today. Is it? The fact that the state Chief Ministers are speaking up and against NCTC, they argue, shows that the country will no longer be able to have a coherent policy on counter terrorism, security sector reforms, intelligence gathering, national defence, all of which are crucial for the continued existence of the country. How accurate is tis argument? 

I am an advocate of true federalism wherein the constituent units of a country are consulted and effectively participate in all important aspects of policymaking for the country as a whole, especially when it has something to do with the domestic space and politics of the country. Notwithstanding my inherent suspicion about anything that has a centralizing feature, I think the participation of state leaders and local politicians and other concerned parties in the policy making of the country will only lead to more democratization and accountability which will make the Indian state more representative and people-friendly in the longer run.  India is too huge a country to have one single opinion on any given issue and by not consulting the varied constituencies, especially the elected ones at the local level, the Central government would only be thrusting totalitarian solutions down the throats of a deeply divided polity.

(Source: Greater Kashmir, 14 APRIL 2013, URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Apr/14/nctc-and-india-s-federal-future-14.asp )