Ever since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) released its election manifesto ahead of the ongoing general elections, there has been a great deal of speculation in New Delhi’s strategic circles that if indeed the rightwing party forms or leads the next government in New Delhi, it will give up on the no first use (NFU) pledge of its nuclear weapon posture. Even though the BJP manifesto only talks about the need to “revise and update” the country’s nuclear programme, Indian and Pakistani media have generated a great deal of unnecessary speculation on the issue by drawing from the hawkish wisdom found in abundance in the national capital. That said, this media speculation has been generated in the context of a persistent belief in the country that the Indian nuclear strategy, both its doctrinal and material elements, are not designed to respond to various threats that the country faces today. Specifically, the argument is that Indian nuclear strategy has proven time and again to be unable to respond to Pakistan when the latter repeatedly probes Indian defences. But before we examine how accurate such a claim is, lets try and understand a bit more about the Indian NFU claim.
The reality is that India’s NFU posture is a drastically watered down one. The 2003 Indian nuclear doctrine states that although India abides by the “Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states”, “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons”. There have been consistent demands for a revision of India’s NFU. For instance, in 2009, the then Army Chief demanded that India should revisit the NFU pledge. The opposition BJP leaders have also demanded in the past that NFU be scrapped (even though they were in power when NFU was adopted by India).
Will giving up India’s limited NFU help it to respond to Pakistani sub-conventional aggression or nuclear blackmail if at all such fears are prompting Indian strategists to consider abandoning NFU? First, a first use policy will have little effect on the sub-conventional aggression (state-sponsored or otherwise) that Pakistan uses against India (a la 26/11). The sub-conventional aggression may be an act of a non-state actor which will not be deterred by nuclear retaliation and even if the Pakistani state is behind such an attack, it will deny any responsibility and even more importantly, it would be foolish on India’s part to use nuclear weapons in response to terror attacks. Secondly, even if Pakistan deploys tactical nuclear weapons and threatens to use them in case of an Indian conventional aggression - which, in response to a Pakistani sub-conventional provocation against India, might take place - how does maintaining a first use policy give India any operational, doctrinal or deterrence advantage? Would India want to use a strategic weapon on Pakistan even before Pakistan unleashes a tactical nuclear weapon on India? And if that is to be ruled out, which I would, then there is no point in giving up its NFU.
From a doctrinal point of view, maintaining the first use of strategic nuclear missiles policy will not have any impact on the Pakistani behavior regarding the use of sub-conventional attacks. That New Delhi will decide to use its strategic nuclear weapons on Pakistan in anticipation of Pakistan’s nuclear use on itself, tactical or otherwise, is also highly improbable and lacks credibility even if one were to discard the reputational and other international costs involved in it.
If anything, maintaining a first use policy of India’s strategic weapons will only go on to destabilize whatever deterrence stability that exists in the South Asian context. This will also additionally mean adopting a launch on warning posture and maintaining hair-trigger alerts leading to possible miscalculation and accidental launches.
What if India were to revise its NFU policy as well as develop tactical nuclear weapons? That, I would argue, places India and Pakistan in similar strategic posture. If the argument is that the current Pakistani nuclear posture (first use policy plus deployment of tactical nuclear weapons) is highly destabilizing, then if India also adopts the same posture, it is going to make the Indo-Pak equation even more destabilizing with the chances of miscalculation and accidental launches increasing many times over. Does India really benefit out of such a posture?
In short, what I am suggesting is that giving up NFU or even developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons in response to Pakistan’s first use policy or tactical weapons is not a useful policy because India’s worry is not really about not matching Pakistan’s nuclear posture, something that is widely considered to be destabilising, but how to respond to Pakistan’s sub-conventional aggression. First use posture or developing tactical nuclear weapons will not resolve that. More importantly, additional Indian dilemmas such as the possibility of Pak-based terror groups getting hold of nuclear weapons or rogue elements within the Pakistani armed forces launching an attack against India or even of accidental launch of nuclear weapons can no way be addressed by adopting a first strike posture or developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons. To address such concerns India will have to explore other options such as, perhaps, a limited Ballistic Missile Defence Shield (BMD).
(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 13, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Apr/13/on-the-desirability-of-nfu-5.asp)
The reality is that India’s NFU posture is a drastically watered down one. The 2003 Indian nuclear doctrine states that although India abides by the “Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states”, “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons”. There have been consistent demands for a revision of India’s NFU. For instance, in 2009, the then Army Chief demanded that India should revisit the NFU pledge. The opposition BJP leaders have also demanded in the past that NFU be scrapped (even though they were in power when NFU was adopted by India).
Will giving up India’s limited NFU help it to respond to Pakistani sub-conventional aggression or nuclear blackmail if at all such fears are prompting Indian strategists to consider abandoning NFU? First, a first use policy will have little effect on the sub-conventional aggression (state-sponsored or otherwise) that Pakistan uses against India (a la 26/11). The sub-conventional aggression may be an act of a non-state actor which will not be deterred by nuclear retaliation and even if the Pakistani state is behind such an attack, it will deny any responsibility and even more importantly, it would be foolish on India’s part to use nuclear weapons in response to terror attacks. Secondly, even if Pakistan deploys tactical nuclear weapons and threatens to use them in case of an Indian conventional aggression - which, in response to a Pakistani sub-conventional provocation against India, might take place - how does maintaining a first use policy give India any operational, doctrinal or deterrence advantage? Would India want to use a strategic weapon on Pakistan even before Pakistan unleashes a tactical nuclear weapon on India? And if that is to be ruled out, which I would, then there is no point in giving up its NFU.
From a doctrinal point of view, maintaining the first use of strategic nuclear missiles policy will not have any impact on the Pakistani behavior regarding the use of sub-conventional attacks. That New Delhi will decide to use its strategic nuclear weapons on Pakistan in anticipation of Pakistan’s nuclear use on itself, tactical or otherwise, is also highly improbable and lacks credibility even if one were to discard the reputational and other international costs involved in it.
If anything, maintaining a first use policy of India’s strategic weapons will only go on to destabilize whatever deterrence stability that exists in the South Asian context. This will also additionally mean adopting a launch on warning posture and maintaining hair-trigger alerts leading to possible miscalculation and accidental launches.
What if India were to revise its NFU policy as well as develop tactical nuclear weapons? That, I would argue, places India and Pakistan in similar strategic posture. If the argument is that the current Pakistani nuclear posture (first use policy plus deployment of tactical nuclear weapons) is highly destabilizing, then if India also adopts the same posture, it is going to make the Indo-Pak equation even more destabilizing with the chances of miscalculation and accidental launches increasing many times over. Does India really benefit out of such a posture?
In short, what I am suggesting is that giving up NFU or even developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons in response to Pakistan’s first use policy or tactical weapons is not a useful policy because India’s worry is not really about not matching Pakistan’s nuclear posture, something that is widely considered to be destabilising, but how to respond to Pakistan’s sub-conventional aggression. First use posture or developing tactical nuclear weapons will not resolve that. More importantly, additional Indian dilemmas such as the possibility of Pak-based terror groups getting hold of nuclear weapons or rogue elements within the Pakistani armed forces launching an attack against India or even of accidental launch of nuclear weapons can no way be addressed by adopting a first strike posture or developing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons. To address such concerns India will have to explore other options such as, perhaps, a limited Ballistic Missile Defence Shield (BMD).
(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 13, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Apr/13/on-the-desirability-of-nfu-5.asp)
