It is indeed premature to talk about ‘Modi Sarkar’ and its policies now, but talking about Modi and his future sarkar seems to be the flavor of the season not just in New Delhi but also in neighbouring capitals. Pakistan’s High Commissioner to New Delhi stated the other day that Islamabad was looking forward to a stable government in New Delhi to continue the dialogue process. He is also apparently encouraged by Modi’s remarks on Indo-Pak relations.
On the one hand, the feeling is that ‘Modi Sarkar’ will be far more decisive and stern in dealing with Pakistan, and on the other hand the argument goes to the other extreme, that is, Modi will basically carry forward the legacy of Atal Bihari Vajpayee who tried to make peaceful relations with Islamabad. Such arguments are essentially a result of the inability of the Congress party to take its policy initiatives towards Pakistan and Kashmir to their logical conclusion. UPA also stayed away from articulating a foreign policy grand strategy.
Lets try to speculate how NDA’s policy towards Pakistan might look like. NDA’s foreign policy towards Pakistan is most likely to be restrained. The reasons for this, first of all, should be found the regional and global strategic contexts within which the new government will be assuming power in New Delhi. For starters, 2014, when the new government will take charge in New Delhi, is not 1998 when the NDA government could have indulged in some strategic adventurism. The BJP, when it came to power in 1998, was keen on developing nuclear weapons (as was the Congress party at that point of time), the Kashmir insurgency was dying down, and Pakistan was on the back foot. New Delhi could have afforded to pursue a revisionist foreign policy agenda and despite repercussions it would have still worked, as it did.
Strategic realities have drastically changed today. Nuclear adventurism - use of nuclear weapons or testing of thermonuclear devices - is not an option today and doing so will only make India strategically isolated. Fighting a war with Pakistan in response to sub-conventional provocations is also not an option: India may not have an easy victory with Pakistan. More importantly, achieving conventional victory under nuclear conditions is not a practical proposition. In short, the NDA government, if it comes to power, will be hemmed in by the sheer constraints of contemporary strategic realties.
Moreover, the NDA regime might want to continue the legacy of the Vajpayee regime that had sought to make peace with Pakistan despite Kargil, IC-814 hijack and the Parliament attack. Vajpayee is widely regarded as a statesman by even his critics who believe that his foreign policy was pretty good in achieving the Indian interests. It is also possible that Modi, being a commercially minded Gujarati, might see the rationale of improving trade with Pakistan which will clearly be in India’s favour in the short to medium term. The Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan, also keen to reap economic benefits for the country, might be willing to see the commercial and economic logic in doing business with India.
So far so good. The problem with this optimistic description is that this is applicable to any government that would take the reigns in New Delhi be it UPA, NDA or the Third Front. The fact is that what makes a hawkish government different from a more accommodative and dovish government is not what it would do during peacetime but what they are likely to do during a crisis. In other words, the real test of a government’s character comes when there is a crisis between India and Pakistan, a possibility that cannot be ruled out.
Let’s compare the crisis behavior of the UPA government with the likely crisis behavior of a Modi-led rightwing government in New Delhi. Past crisis behavior of the UPA regime showed that it was highly risk averse and tended to diffuse tension rather then escalating them, rightly so. Thanks to the strategic restraint exercised by the UPA regime, there wasn’t an all-out war between India and Pakistan. Indeed, this is true of the Vajpayee regime as well to a great extent. Despite the aggressive rhetoric and posture, the NDA regime exercised great restraint during and after the 2001-2002 military standoff.
Will a BJP-led government in New Delhi with hawks in key national security and foreign policy positions behave differently? First of all, their postures and articulations are risk-prone. The media pressure on the government to act ‘decisively’ during a crisis can be immense and it would take a great deal of political courage to explore strategies other than war. More so, the BJP has for too long been claiming that the UPA regime has not taught Pakistan a lesson for sponsoring terrorism and killing Indian soldiers on the LoC. Such a party will have to do exceptionally well to avoid what it has been asking the UPA regime to do – teach Pakistan a lesson! Even if the thinking in New Delhi, while engaging in aggressive rhetoric, would be to force Islamabad to back out in a balance of resolve, the reality is that your articulations and postures could potentially govern your crisis behavior.
(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 27, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Apr/27/modi-sarkar-s-pakistan-policy-5.asp)
On the one hand, the feeling is that ‘Modi Sarkar’ will be far more decisive and stern in dealing with Pakistan, and on the other hand the argument goes to the other extreme, that is, Modi will basically carry forward the legacy of Atal Bihari Vajpayee who tried to make peaceful relations with Islamabad. Such arguments are essentially a result of the inability of the Congress party to take its policy initiatives towards Pakistan and Kashmir to their logical conclusion. UPA also stayed away from articulating a foreign policy grand strategy.
Lets try to speculate how NDA’s policy towards Pakistan might look like. NDA’s foreign policy towards Pakistan is most likely to be restrained. The reasons for this, first of all, should be found the regional and global strategic contexts within which the new government will be assuming power in New Delhi. For starters, 2014, when the new government will take charge in New Delhi, is not 1998 when the NDA government could have indulged in some strategic adventurism. The BJP, when it came to power in 1998, was keen on developing nuclear weapons (as was the Congress party at that point of time), the Kashmir insurgency was dying down, and Pakistan was on the back foot. New Delhi could have afforded to pursue a revisionist foreign policy agenda and despite repercussions it would have still worked, as it did.
Strategic realities have drastically changed today. Nuclear adventurism - use of nuclear weapons or testing of thermonuclear devices - is not an option today and doing so will only make India strategically isolated. Fighting a war with Pakistan in response to sub-conventional provocations is also not an option: India may not have an easy victory with Pakistan. More importantly, achieving conventional victory under nuclear conditions is not a practical proposition. In short, the NDA government, if it comes to power, will be hemmed in by the sheer constraints of contemporary strategic realties.
Moreover, the NDA regime might want to continue the legacy of the Vajpayee regime that had sought to make peace with Pakistan despite Kargil, IC-814 hijack and the Parliament attack. Vajpayee is widely regarded as a statesman by even his critics who believe that his foreign policy was pretty good in achieving the Indian interests. It is also possible that Modi, being a commercially minded Gujarati, might see the rationale of improving trade with Pakistan which will clearly be in India’s favour in the short to medium term. The Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan, also keen to reap economic benefits for the country, might be willing to see the commercial and economic logic in doing business with India.
So far so good. The problem with this optimistic description is that this is applicable to any government that would take the reigns in New Delhi be it UPA, NDA or the Third Front. The fact is that what makes a hawkish government different from a more accommodative and dovish government is not what it would do during peacetime but what they are likely to do during a crisis. In other words, the real test of a government’s character comes when there is a crisis between India and Pakistan, a possibility that cannot be ruled out.
Let’s compare the crisis behavior of the UPA government with the likely crisis behavior of a Modi-led rightwing government in New Delhi. Past crisis behavior of the UPA regime showed that it was highly risk averse and tended to diffuse tension rather then escalating them, rightly so. Thanks to the strategic restraint exercised by the UPA regime, there wasn’t an all-out war between India and Pakistan. Indeed, this is true of the Vajpayee regime as well to a great extent. Despite the aggressive rhetoric and posture, the NDA regime exercised great restraint during and after the 2001-2002 military standoff.
Will a BJP-led government in New Delhi with hawks in key national security and foreign policy positions behave differently? First of all, their postures and articulations are risk-prone. The media pressure on the government to act ‘decisively’ during a crisis can be immense and it would take a great deal of political courage to explore strategies other than war. More so, the BJP has for too long been claiming that the UPA regime has not taught Pakistan a lesson for sponsoring terrorism and killing Indian soldiers on the LoC. Such a party will have to do exceptionally well to avoid what it has been asking the UPA regime to do – teach Pakistan a lesson! Even if the thinking in New Delhi, while engaging in aggressive rhetoric, would be to force Islamabad to back out in a balance of resolve, the reality is that your articulations and postures could potentially govern your crisis behavior.
(Source: Greater Kashmir, April 27, 2014. URL: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/Apr/27/modi-sarkar-s-pakistan-policy-5.asp)
